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INTRODUCTION

The years since the 2000 presidential election have witnessed unprecedented
attention to the mechanics of election administration. Legislators,' academics, 2 and

*Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. A.B., Harvard
University; J.D., Yale Law School. Thanks to Dave Becker, Ned Foley, and Spencer Overton for their
detailed comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to Mitch Witkov and Caitlin Downing for their
excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (Supp. II 2002)
(amending voting laws in the wake of the 2000 election); Florida Election Reform Act of 2001, FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 101.5604-56042 (West 2002) (mandating that counties use "an electronic or
electromechanical precinct-count tabulation voting system" and prohibiting punch-card ballots); Act
of Apr. 18,2001, No. 166,2001 Ga. Laws 269 (amending Georgia voting laws); Act of May 15,2001,
ch. 564, 2001 Md. Laws 3013-23 (amending Maryland laws and requiring uniform statewide voting
systems).
2. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 937 (2005) (discussing
problems with the 2004 presidential election); Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform:
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the public at large 3 have focused on a variety of practices that had previously been

the province of a relatively narrow group of election officials. Among the
administrative practices considered under the general rubric of "election reform" are
voter registration, provisional voting, ballot security measures, voting machines,
early and absentee voting, challenges to voter eligibility, and the process for
recounts and contests. 4 Recognizing that every vote really does matter, at least in
some elections, the parties have made these areas a new electoral battleground.5

Advocacy groups have also sprung into action. After the 2000 election, for
example, civil rights groups brought litigation in several states over whether voting
equipment like the now-notorious punch-card voting system had a disparate impact
on people of color.6 There have also been several legal cases challenging felon
disenfranchisement, a practice that some believe to have been determinative in
Florida's 2000 election.7
On the other side of the ideological spectrum,
conservatives have argued for stringent ballot security measures in the name of
fraud prevention. 8 Most recently, Republican legislators in a number of states have
proposed-and in two instances passed-legislation requiring voters to show photo
identification in order to have their votes counted. 9
This focus on the "nuts-and-bolts"'

of election administration coincides with

increased attention to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). Congressional
consideration of the VRA provisions set to expire in 2007 has led to a vigorous
debate over whether the concerns that led to its enactment more than forty years ago

remain salient in the twenty-first century. The confirmation hearings of Chief
Discretion, Disenfranchisement,and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1206,
1220-39 (2005) (discussing problems with the 2004 presidential election in Ohio).
3. See, e.g., Day to Day: CommentaryforFederallyIssued Voter RegistrationCards (NPR radio
broadcast Nov. 1, 2004) (noting poll showing 58% of voters believed there could be another "Floridastyle mess" on election day 2004); Bob Ney & Steny H. Hoyer, Op-Ed., Reform the Election Process:
Get Rid of Ancient Technology and FederalMandates, WASH. TIMES, May 30,2001, at A15 (noting
polls showing that "Americans overwhelmingly support election reform").
4. For a detailed discussion of litigation regarding these issues in the 2004 election, see Tokaji,
supra note 2, at 1220-39.
5. See, e.g., James Dao, The 2004 Campaign:Battlegrounds:Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,2004,
GI, at 27 (describing efforts of parties and other groups to gear up for election fights in 2004); Lawyers
Become Factorin Election, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE (Ga.), Oct. 30, 2004, at A9 (describing plans for
litigation in the event of a close election in 2004).
6. See Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 625, 647
(2002); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73
FORDHAM L. REv. 1711, 1743 (2005); see also Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1222 (noting disparate impact
of punch-card voting machines on African Americans).
7. Christopher Uggen & JeffManza, DemocraticContraction?PoliticalConsequencesof Felon
Disenfranchisementin the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REv. 777, 792-93, 793 tbl.4a (2002).
8. See JOHN FUND, STEALING ELECTIONS: How VOTER FRAUD THREATENS OUR DEMOCRACY
(2004); John H. Fund, Marylanders will Vote Early---and Often, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2006, at A13.
9. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (Supp. 2005); IND. CODE § 3-5-2-40.5 (Supp. 2005);WIS.
STAT. § 5.02 (Supp. 2005).
10. Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Futureof Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 377, 378 (2001).
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Justice Roberts and Justice Alito also resulted in renewed attention to the VRA,
including their past writings on Section 2, which prohibits any practice that "results
in a denial or abridgement of the right ... to vote on account of race.""
This Article focuses on the cases in which these two areas-election reform and
VRA enforcement-intersect. More specifically, it focuses on cases in which
minority voters allege that the rules or practices governing the administration of
elections result in the disproportionate denial of their votes. The most prominent
examples that have arisen in recent years are in the areas of voting equipment, felon
disenfranchisement, and voter ID requirements. The question that frames my
analysis is how the VRA, particularly Section 2, should apply to these cases. 2 If
the controversies in 2000 and 2004 are any indication, the mechanics of election
administration will be the subject of continuing litigation in years to come. It is
therefore critical that courts develop a fair and workable standard to assess claims
that minority voters have been excluded from equally participating in the electoral
process.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish two analytically distinct types of
VRA cases: those involving vote denial and those involving vote dilution. "Vote
denial" refers to practices that prevent people from voting or having their votes
counted. Historically, examples of practices resulting in vote denial include literacy
tests, poll taxes, all-white primaries, and English-only ballots. "Vote dilution," on
the other hand, refers to practices that diminish minorities' political influence in
places where they are allowed to vote. Chief examples of vote-dilution practices
include at-large elections and redistricting plans that keep minorities' voting
strength weak.' 3 The first generation of VRA enforcement focused mainly on vote

denial, while the second generation, which began in earnest in the 1980s, focused
mainly on vote dilution. 4 The application of the VRA to practices such as felon
disenfranchisement, voting machines, and voter ID laws represents a new

11. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
12. Though my focus in this article is on Section 2 of the VRA, much of my analysis would also
apply to preclearance determinations under Section 5. I mostly limit my discussion to Section 2,
however, because the Supreme Court has interpreted the legal standard under these two sections of the
VRA to be different. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 478 (2003); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch.
Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 477 (1997).
13. Richard L. Engstrom, RacialDiscriminationin the ElectoralProcess: The Voting Rights Act
and the Vote Dilution Issue, in PARTY POLITICS INTHE SOUTH 197, 197 (Robert P. Steed et al. eds.,

1980) (defining dilution as "the practice of reducing the potential effectiveness of a group's voting
strength by limiting its ability to translate that strength into the control of (or at least influence with)
elected public officials"); Arnand Derfner, Racial Discriminationand the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L.

REv. 523, 553-58 (1973) (describing various practices used for vote dilution and vote denial).
14. Pamela S. Karlan, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on African Americans: Second- and
Third-GenerationIssues, in VOTING RIGHTS AND REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 121, 122-23

(Mark E. Rush ed. 1998) (discussing first- and second-generation VRA questions); Anthony A.
Peacock, From Beer to Eternity: Why Race Will Always Predominateunder the Voting Rights Act, in
REDISTRICTING INTHE NEW MILLENIUM 119, 124-27 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005) (same).
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generation of VRA enforcement. " This Article collectively refers to these practices
16
as the "new vote denial."'

While a substantial body of case law and academic commentary addresses the
application of Section 2 to vote dilution cases, there has been much less focus on
the statute's application to vote denial cases. That is largely because Congress
primarily focused on vote dilution cases, such as at-large elections, when it enacted
the 1982 amendments to the VRA that added the "results test." It is clear, however,

that this test applies to vote denial as well as vote dilution. Under the unambiguous
language of Section 2, the results test applies to practices that "deny" the equal right
to vote as well as to those practices which merely "abridge" it. While cases since
the 1980s have lent some clarity to the legal standard that applies in Section 2 vote

dilution claims, it is anything but clear what standard should apply to vote denial
claims. The most detailed analysis of this problem appears in cases involving state
felon disenfranchisement laws; but, as I shall explain, the courts' analyses of the

question leaves much unanswered-or at least unsatisfactorily answered.
This Article attempts to address these shortcomings in case law and academic

literature by suggesting a legal standard that should govern Section 2 vote denial
claims. I recommend a burden-shifting test that borrows from cases interpreting
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and, to a lesser extent, juror selection cases
under the Equal Protection Clause. Under my proposed test, voters would have the

initial burden to show that the challenged practice interacts with social and
historical conditions, resulting in the disproportionate denial of minority votes. The
state or local entity whose practice is challenged would then have the opportunity

15. The first two generations of voting rights enforcement correspond to the first two components
of the right to vote that Professor Karlan has identified: participation and aggregation. See Pamela S.
Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 249
(1993). She has also identified a third interest: governance. Id. She and some other commentators
have referred to claims involving democratic governance as the "third generation" of voting rights
enforcement. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 14, at 23 ("The emerging 'third generation' of voting rights
issues focuses on questions of governance."); Lani Guinier, The Representationof Minority Interests:
The Question of Single-Member Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1135, 1152 (1993) ("In the third
generation, the marginalization of minority group interest is reproduced in the newly integrated
legislature."). However, as Professor Karlan noted, the Supreme Court's decision in Presley v. Etowah
County Commission, 502 U.S. 491 (1992), has frustrated the emergence of-or at least the ability to
use the VRA for-third-generation claims. Karlan, supra note 14, at 125. I thus omit governance
claims from my discussion.
16. Practices that result in the disproportionate denial of minorities' votes may, of course, have
the ultimate effect of diminishing their collective strength and their ability to elect representatives of
their choice. In this sense, then, vote-denying practices may also have-in fact, they necessarily
have-a dilutive effect, implicating the interest of vote aggregation as well as that of voter
participation. See supra note 15. Nevertheless, for purposes of simplicity, this Article uses the terms
"vote denial" and "vote dilution" in a mutually exclusive way-the former referring to practices that
prevent minorities from voting or having their votes counted, and the latter to practices that result in
the diminution of minority voting strength where they are permitted to vote and have their votes
counted. This terminology is not meant to deny that vote-denying practices may in the aggregate dilute
minority voting strength.
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to show that the practice is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. This
test has the advantage of capturing those practices that weaken minorities' voting
strength and may arise from intentional discrimination, while still taking into
account governmental ends that may be so strong as to warrant disproportionate
barriers to minority participation. 17
Part II of this Article reviews developments in the area of election
administration since the 2000 election. Part III briefly traces the first two
generations of VRA enforcement, including the 1982 amendments to Section 2 that
gave rise to the results test. It then examines the new generation of voting rights
claims, considering how Section 2 applies to practices that result in the
disproportionate denial of minority votes. Part IV articulates a test for Section 2
vote denial claims and explains why Section 2, if interpreted in this manner, would
satisfy constitutional scrutiny as applied to vote-denying practices.
IX. ELECTION REFORM: POST-2000 DEVELOPMENTS

Since the 2000 presidential election, there has been a great deal of public,
scholarly, and legislative attention to the mechanics of election administration."
The razor-thin margin of victory in that election revealed the dark underbelly of
Florida's electoral system, and it quickly became apparent that the problems in the
Sunshine State were hardly unique. This in turn triggered a flurry of litigation and
legislation, including the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). That law,
however, has not ended the debates over election reform, but instead has largely
moved those debates to the state level. Cognizant that every vote does indeed
matter, at least in some elections, the parties and voting rights advocates are
increasingly attending to the gritty details of elections that relatively few people had
noticed before. To understand the implications of the VRA on the changing
electoral ecosystem, it is necessary to first review the key developments during this
period.
The story of the intensified focus on the mechanics of elections starts with the
2000 election and the opinion in Bush v. Gore.'9 With the pivotal state of Florida
hanging in the balance, then-Vice President Al Gore sought a recount of punch-card
ballots in four key counties. 2' After the Florida Elections Canvassing Commission
certified the election for his opponent George W. Bush, Vice President Gore filed
a contest of the election pursuant to state law.21 Vice President Gore prevailed in

17. My focus here is on the test that courts should apply in Section 2 vote denial cases and, as
explained below, such a test is fully consistent with the text and history of the existing statute.
Congress could certainly amend Section 2 to expressly incorporate my proposed test, though I think that
courts could and should adopt this test even without an amendment.
18. See supra notes 1-3.
19. 531 U.S. 98 (2000)
20. Id. at 101.
21. Id.
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the Florida Supreme Court, which ordered a statewide recount,22 but the United
States Supreme Court reversed, effectively ending the election.23
The post-election wrangling revealed the problems in Florida' s election system,
long shrouded from public view. These events led those on both sides of the aisle
to recognize the need for election reform. The United States Supreme Court
anticipated this need in its Bush v. Gore opinion, noting:
The closeness of this election, and the multitude of legal
challenges which have followed in its wake, have brought into
sharp focus a common, if heretofore unnoticed, phenomenon.
Nationwide statistics reveal that an estimated 2% of ballots cast do
not register a vote for President for whatever reason, including
deliberately choosing no candidate at all or some voter error, such
as voting for two candidates or insufficiently marking a ballot....
This case has shown that punchcard balloting machines can
produce an unfortunate number of ballots which are not punched
in a clean, complete way by the voter. After the current counting,
it is likely legislative bodies nationwide will examine ways to
improve the mechanisms and machinery for voting.24
In fact, it was not only the voting machines, but the entire infrastructure of
American elections that was subject to scrutiny in the aftermath of the 2000
election. Congress was not the only entity to undertake a thorough examination of
this infrastructure. A number of commissions and other bodies produced thorough
reports examining various aspects of U.S. elections, from machines, to registration,
to polling place operations. 25 Racial inequalities arising from existing voting
equipment and other electoral practices were among the areas that received
attention. An analysis released by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, for
example, found that "blacks were far more likely than non-blacks to have their
ballots rejected" by Florida's voting equipment. 26 The Commission also found that

22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 101-02.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 103-04.
See HENRY E. BRADY ET AL., COUNTING ALL THE VOTES: THE PERFORMANCE OF VOTING

TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2001); CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECH. PROJECT, VOTING: WHAT
IS, WHATCOULD BE 1 (2001) [hereinafter CALTECH/MITREPORT]; NAT'LCOMM'N ON FED. REFORM,
To ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 1 (2002) [hereinafter CARTER-FORD
REPORT]; U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001).
26. ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, REPORT ON THE RACIAL IMPACT OF THE REJECTION OF BALLOTS CAST
IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA 3 (2001). This is consistent with the

racial disparities that subsequent studies found to exist nationwide. See Tokaji, supra note 6, at
1763-67.
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Florida's "overzealous" purge of its registration lists resulted in the disproportionate
exclusion of African American voters.27
One of the most significant findings during the post-2000 period was that the
voting machines were probably not, after all, the largest source of lost votes in the
2000 election. According to the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project's 2001
report, that dubious distinction belonged to registration problems, which accounted
for some 1.5 to 3 million lost votes in 2000.28 Voting equipment and ballot layout
problems accounted for another 1.5 to 2 million lost votes, with up to a million more
lost due to polling place operations. 29 A blue ribbon commission, co-chaired by
former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford (commonly known as the CarterFord Commission), likewise took a broad look at the American election system. Its
final report recommended changes in a wide range of areas, including voting
equipment, registration, overseas voting, felon voting, early voting, ID
requirements, and the creation of a new federal agency to oversee election
administration.3" Several of these recommendations became a part of HAVA.
Recognizing that equipment was only one of many challenges facing the United
States' electoral system, Congress began consideration of election reform legislation
in early 2001, but the end-product of its efforts, HAVA, did not become law until
October 29, 2002."' During the interim period, there was intense partisan
disagreement over what shape election reform should take.32 One of the issues in
dispute was the extent to which mandates should be imposed on the states, as
opposed to simply providing incentives to improve their election systems-in other
words, whether to provide carrots or sticks. On an ideological level, the battle
between the parties largely revolved around the tension between access and
integrity, with Democrats generally favoring measures advancing the former value
and Republicans the latter.33
A major focal point of the access-versus-integrity debate was whether to require
voters to show some form of identification when they appeared at the polls. The
ultimate version of HAVA included a limited ID requirement, applicable only to
first-time voters who registered by mail on or after January 1, 2003. 3 HAVA does
not require voters to show photo identification, but instead allows various other

27. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, at xiv (2001).
28. CALTECH/MiT REPORT, supra note 25, at 8.
29. Id. at 9.
30. CARTER-FORD REPORT, supra note 25, at 6-14.
31. For a more detailed description of HAVA's legislative history, see Leonard M. Shambon,
Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 ELECTION L.J. 424 (2004).
32. See David Mark, With Next Election Only a Year Away, Proponentsof Ballot Overhaul
Focus Their Hopes on 2004, 59 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2532, 2532 (2001).
33. See Tokaji, supranote 2, at 1207; Spencer Overton, Stealing Democracy: How Politicians
Exclude Voters to Win Elections 131-32 (Aug. 20, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the

author).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 1548(b)(1) (Supp. II 2002).
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documents that show the voter's name and address, such as a utility bill, bank
statement, or government document.35 Congress tied this limited ID requirement
to the requirement that all states implement computerized statewide registration
lists, including the name and registration information for every voter within each
state.36
Other provisions of HAVA address voting equipment, providing financial
incentives for states to eliminate punch-card and lever machines 37 and imposing
minimum requirements for disability access and auditability. 38 The Act also
requires all states to implement provisional voting, which allows voters whose
names do not appear on the registration list to cast a conditional ballot that will be
counted if their eligibility is later confirmed.39 Aside from these basic requirements,
however, HAVA left most of the details of election reform to state and local
election officials.4" It is within the states, therefore, that some of the most important
election reform battles have taken place.
Even before HAVA's enactment, several states took some steps toward election
reform, mostly on the voting technology front. After the 2000 election, the
American Civil Liberties Union brought lawsuits in five states (Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, California, and Ohio) challenging the use of punch-card voting
equipment.4 Each lawsuit asserted the use of this equipment had a disparate impact
on voters of color, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.4 2 The
lawsuits also alleged that the use of punch-card voting systems in some counties but
not others denied equal protection rights to voters of all races under Bush v.
Gore and other cases.43 As these lawsuits proceeded, some state legislative bodies
took up the call for election reform." Not surprisingly, Florida was quick to act.
The Florida Election Reform Act of 2001 provided for voting equipment upgrades,
as well as poll worker training, voter education, and a voter registration database.45
Georgia and Maryland also enacted legislation providing for voting system

35. Id. § 15483(b)(1) & (2).
36. Id. § 15483(a)(1).
37. Id. § 15302.
38. Id. § 15481.
39. Id. § 15482.
40. Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1207-08. For a more detailed description of HAVA's requirements,
see id. at 1214-18.
41. Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1729-30. The author was co-counsel in the California and Ohio cases.
42. Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1729 & n. 127; see also ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, REPORT ON THE RACIAL
IMPACT OF THE REJECTION OF BALLOTS CAST IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE STATE OF
FLORIDA 3 (2001) (finding "blacks were far more likely than non-blacks to have their ballots rejected");
Michael Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting Equipment Affect the Racial Gap in
Voided Ballots?, 47 AM. J. POL. SCl. 46, 48-49 (2003) (finding a racial gap in uncounted ballots
between black and white voters with punch-card and optical-scan systems).
43. Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1729 & n.126.
44. Id. at 1730-32.
45. Id. at 1730-31.
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improvements in 2001, and California voters approved a bond act that provided
funds for new voting equipment in 2002.46
Most other states, however, did not take significant steps toward the
improvement of election administration until after HAVA's enactment in late 2002.
HAVA required each state to formulate a detailed implementation plan.47 Yet
implementation proceeded more slowly than Congress anticipated, partly due to the
President's delay in appointing members to the Election Assistance Commission
(EAC), the body responsible for overseeing HAVA's implementation.48 The failure
to fully and promptly fund the EAC's work also hampered implementation efforts.49
States were reluctant to move forward with election reform and did not fully
implement many of HAVA' s requirements-most notably those relating to voting
technology and state registration databases-in time for the 2004 election.5" That
election witnessed unprecedented attention to the mechanics of election
administration from the two major parties and independent groups. Among their
specific areas of focus were voting machines, registration requirements, provisional
voting, ID requirements, challenges to voter eligibility, and long lines at some
polling places.5
The 2004 election showed that the work of election reform is far from
complete, and studies conducted since then reveal that substantial problems
remain.52 Fortunately, there is an increased focus on collecting data and other
information on the functioning of American election administration. One product
was a comprehensive survey of election officials, conducted after the 2004 election
at the behest of the EAC. Billed as "the largest and most comprehensive survey
of voting and election administration practices ever conducted by a U.S.
government organization," the survey examined such areas as voter registration,
ballots counted, voting equipment usage, and polling place operations.54 One of the
more favorable findings is that only 1.02 percent of ballots cast in 2004 did not
register a vote for President, the lowest in a post-World War II presidential

46. Id. at 1731.

47. 42 U.S.C. § 15403(b) (Supp. 1I 2002). These plans can be found at 69 Fed. Reg.
14,001-15,232 (Mar. 24, 2004).
48. Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1219.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1219-20.
51. The controversies over these issues in the critical swing state of Ohio are discussed at length
in Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1220-39.
52. See CENTURY FOUND. WORKING GROUP ON STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ELECTION REFORM,
BALANCING ACCESS AND INTEGRITY 1 (2005); COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING
CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS 1 (2005), http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full-report.pdf.
53. ELECTION DATA SERVS., INC., U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE

2004 ELECTION DAY SURVEY 1 (2005) [hereinafter ELECTION DAY SURVEY],
http://www.eac.gov/election survey-2004/pdf/EDS-Full-Report-wTables.pdf.

available at

54. Id. at 1.
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election.55 But among the most striking findings of the 2004 Election Day Survey
are the substantial disparities based on race, language, and class in a wide range of
areas. As set forth in the survey's executive summary:
Jurisdictions with low education and income, compared with other
jurisdictions, tend to report more inactive voter registration, lower
voter turnout, higher number of provisional ballots cast, higher
drop-off and associated components of overvotes and undervotes,
lower average number of poll workers per polling place, and
greater percentage of inadequately staffed polling places. While
these patterns present a challenge to election administrators, they
are consistent with a large body of academic literature that equates
higher levels of civic participation to higher levels of education
and income.56
To take one example, African American jurisdictions reported a greater percentage
of polling places with inadequate numbers of poll workers.57 Conversely,
jurisdictions with higher income and education levels reported a higher average
number of poll workers.58
The 2004 Election Day Survey also found substantial disparities with respect
to language minorities. It specifically examined jurisdictions with a substantial
number or percentage of non-English proficient residents, which are covered by
Section 203 of the VRA, finding:
Jurisdictions covered by the Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act
tended to report more inactive voter registration, lower voter
turnout, fewer returned absentee ballots, and much greater
numbers of provisional ballots cast. These patterns were often
similar to those found among predominantly Hispanic and
predominantly non-Hispanic Native American jurisdictions. These
findings appear to be consistent with voters within these
jurisdictions having difficulty in navigating the electoral process
in a language that is not their native tongue.59

55. Id. at 5; see also Charles Stewart 1II, Residual Vote in the 2004 Election I (Cal.Tech/MIT
Voting Tech. Project, Working Paper No. 25, 2005), available at http://vote.caltech.edu/media/
documents/wps/vtp.wp25.pdf (estimating that one-million votes were "saved" in 2004 due to better
equipment and polling place procedures).
56. ELECTION DAY SURVEY, supra note 53, at 9.
57. Id. at 7.
58. Id. The text in this paragraph and the paragraph that follows appears in substantially similar form
in Equal Vote Blog, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokajit2OO5/09/race-language-class-and-voting.htmil (Sept.
28, 2005, 23:26 EST).
59. ELECTION DAY SURVEY, supra note 53, at 9.
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These findings suggest that significant disparities remain in the administration of
elections and that racial and language minorities are more likely to bear the brunt
of those inequalities.
Since the 2004 election, the access-versus-integrity debate has become even
more intense. As was the case in Congress before HAVA's enactment, a focal
point of the debate in the states has been voter ID. Republican legislators in several
states have advanced bills that would impose stricter voter ID requirements than
HAVA, which only requires identification of first-time voters who registered by
mail and does not require photographic identification. 60 A number of states have
debated laws that would require all voters to show photo identification.
Two states-Indiana and Georgia-passed laws in 2005 that require all voters
to show a government-issued photo ID in order to have their votes counted. 6 Both
laws have resulted in litigation. A federal judge in Georgia issued a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of that state's photo ID law,62 but relief was denied
in the suit challenging Indiana's law.63 The available evidence indicates that people
of color are less likely to have a driver's license, and thus would be more severely
affected by photo ID requirements. A Wisconsin study, for example, found that
African American voters were significantly less likely to have a state-issued driver's
license. 64 In addition, career staff in the U.S. Department of Justice wrote a detailed
memorandum assessing the racial impact of Georgia's 2005 photo ID law. 65 That
memorandum concluded that the law would have a disproportionate impact on
black voters,66 who are less likely to have access to a vehicle, and thus, presumably,
to have a driver's license. The Department of Justice nevertheless precleared
Georgia's law, against its career staff s recommendation.67
Other states have enacted laws that impose stricter identification requirements
than HAVA, but do not require photo identification. In Arizona, for example,
voters enacted a law that requires voters to show either a photo ID or two forms of

60. See infra Part III.A.2.
61. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (Supp. 2005); IND. CODE § 3-5-2-40.5 (Supp. 2005).
62. See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
Subsequent to that order, the Georgia legislature enacted a modified version of its photo ID law (S.B.
84), which the Governor signed into law in January 2006. See Nancy Badertscher & Sonji Jacobs,
Voter ID Costs Still Debated; Counties Say They're Already Overworked, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan.
28, 2006, at 1E.
63. See Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20321, at *1-8 (S.D. Ind. Apr.
14, 2006).

64. John Pawasarat, The Driver License Status of the Voting Age Population in Wisconsin 1-2
(June 2005), http://www.uwm.edu/Dept/ETIlbarriers/DriversLicense.pdf..
65. Memorandum from Robert Berman, Deputy Chief, et al. to U.S. Dep't of Justice (Aug. 25,
2005) [hereinafter Berman Memorandum], availableat http://www.votingrights.org/news/downloads/
Section%205%20Recommendation%20Memorandum.pdf.

66. Id. at 51.
67. I discuss the Georgia preclearance decision and consider its implications for the Section 5
preclearance process in Daniel P. Tokaji, If It's Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act
Preclearance,49 How. L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
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non-photo identification. 68 And in 2006, the Ohio legislature passed a bill that
requires either a state-issued photo ID, a military photo ID, or a non-photo ID with
the voter's name and current address.69

State felon disenfranchisement laws have also received considerable attention
in the years since the 2000 election. All but sixteen states apply legal restrictions
on voting to some felons who are no longer in prison.7" A total of fourteen states
deny the vote to some or all ex-felons who have completed their sentences,
including probation and parole.7 One study estimated if ex-offenders who had

completed their sentence had been allowed to vote in Florida, Vice President Gore
would have carried the state by more than 31,000 votes.72

Noting the trend away

from lifetime disenfranchisement, the Carter-Ford Report recommended the
restoration of voting rights for those who have completed their sentences, including
those on probation or parole.73 The report questioned, however, whether Congress
has the power to eliminate felon disenfranchisement, 74 and HAVA was silent on the

subject.
Still, some significant developments on ex-felons' voting rights have occurred
in the states.75 Several states now restore ex-offenders' voting rights automatically
upon the completion of their sentences or some period of time afterward.76
Evidence shows the general public is beginning to view the reinstatement of exoffenders' voting rights more favorably. 7

The debates surrounding felon disenfranchisement have a prominent racial
component because of the racial disparities in the rates of felon
disenfranchisement78 and the historical link between race and criminal

68. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-579(A) (Supp. 2005).
69. H.B. 3, 126th Gen. Assem., sec. 3501.19, 2006 Ohio Legis. Bull. 75 (LexisNexis), available
at 2005 Ohio HB 3 (LexisNexis).
70. Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Punishment and Democracy: Disenfranchisement of
NonincarceratedFelons in the United States, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 491, 494 tbl. 1(2004).
71. Id.
72. Uggen & Manza, supra note 7, at 793 tbl.4a.
73. CARTER-FORD REPORT, supra note 25, at 45-46.
74. Id. at 45.
75. Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate
over FelonDisenfranchisement,56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1147-48 (2004); see also THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2005), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf (summarizing developments in the states between
1997 and 2005).
76. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN & JEFF MANZA, SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO STATE FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAW, 1865-2003 (2003), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/
pdfs/UggenManzaSummary.pdf.
77.
See Brian Pinaire et al., Barred from the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the
Disenfranchisementof Felons, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1519, 1540-41 (2003); Jeff Manza et al., "Civil
Death" or Civil Rights? PublicAttitudes Towards Felon Disenfranchisementin the United States 22
(Mar. 4, 2003), http://www.socsci.umn.edu/-uggen/POQ8.pdf.
78. Developments in the Law-The Law of Prisons, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1838, 1941 (2002).
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disenfranchisement. 79 Since 2000, three federal courts of appeals have addressed
state felon disenfranchisement laws. As discussed at greater length below,8 ° each
of these cases included a VRA claim based on racial disparities arising from the
disenfranchisement of ex-offenders.5 ' These cases have thus far yielded mixed
results, and the legal standard applicable to felon disenfranchisement and other
voter qualifications under Section 2 of the VRA is anything but clear.8 2 As in other
areas of election administration, considerable uncertainty remains over the extent
to which racial inequalities affecting electoral participation can and should be
tolerated.
III. VOTING RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT: FROM DENIAL TO DILUTION AND BACK AGAIN
As the developments since 2000 reveal, racial equality figures prominently in
the ongoing debate over election reform. The evidence generated in those debates
shows that racial and language minorities continue to experience unequal treatment
in various aspects of the voting process. While intentional discrimination is difficult
to establish, existing evidence supports the conclusion that identification
requirements, outdated voting equipment, and felon disenfranchisement laws bear
most heavily on African American and Latino voters. These inequalities raise the
critical question of whether such practices violate the VRA, the core purpose of
which is to ensure voting equality for racial and language minorities.
To answer this question, I now turn to a discussion of the VRA, focusing
especially on Section 2's prohibition of practices that deny or abridge voting rights
on account of race. As I explain, the first generation of VRA enforcement largely
focused on practices that denied the vote to racial minorities-especially African
Americans in the South-while second-generation enforcement mainly focused on
practices that diluted minority voting strength. After reviewing this history, I return
to the subject of election administration in Part I.B and discuss the new generation
of VRA cases applying Section 2 to practices allegedly having a disparate impact
on minority voters.

79. For a discussion of the history of felon disenfranchisement, focusing on its application to
racial minorities, see Manza & Uggen, supra note 70, at 492-93.
80. See infra Part II.B.3.
81. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, Johnson v.
Bush, 126 S. Ct. 650 (2005); Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2004); Farrakhan v.
Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003).
82.
The Ninth Circuit reinstated a VRA Section 2 challenge to Washington's felon
disenfranchisement law. See Farrakhan,338 F.3dat 1011-12. The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand,
rejected a VRA Section 2 and Fourteenth Amendment challenge to Florida's felon disenfranchisement
law, see Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1216-17, and the Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari, See
Johnson v. Bush, 126 S. Ct. 650, 650-51 (2005). A three-judge panel of the Second Circuit likewise
rejected a VRA Section 2 challenge to New York's law disenfranchising current felons and parolees.
See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 130. The full court subsequently decided to rehear that case en banc, see
Muntaqim v. Coombe, 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004), and the matter is still pending before that court.
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First-and Second-Generation Claims

Upon its enactment in 1965, the VRA had an immediate impact by opening the
voting booths to Southern blacks who had been excluded since the late nineteenth

century. The first generation of VRA enforcement consisted largely of dismantling
formal barriers to African American participation. Three prior voting rights
laws-passed in 1957, 1960, and 1964-were of limited effectiveness because they
depended mostly on litigation for enforcement.83 In some cases, Southern federal
judges were reluctant to undo barriers to African American participation.8 4 In other
cases, Southern officials adopted new exclusionary practices immediately after the
old ones had been stopped."
The VRA overwhelmed the system of disenfranchisement that had kept blacks

out of Southern politics. Between 1965 and 1967, African American voter
registration in states covered by the VRA increased from 29.3 percent to 52.1
percent.8 6 TheVRA's immediate success was largely attributable to Section 4, the
centerpiece of the 1965 Act, which temporarily suspended literacy tests.87 The

deployment of federal examiners under Sections 6 through 8 of the VRA was also
critical in helping to register eligible black voters.88
Although enacted ten years later, the 1975 amendments to the VRA, which

added protections for language minorities, 89 may be seen as part of the first
generation of enforcement. Those amendments expanded Section 4's coverage

beyond the South to portions of the Southwest and West,90 thereby bringing
significant numbers of Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native Americans within the
VRA's scope.9 The amendments also banned literacy tests and required bilingual

materials in places with a substantial percentage (more than five percent) of nonEnglish proficient voters.92 Between the 1965 Act and the 1975 amendments, the

83. BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING
EQUALITY 12-15 (1992).
84. Id. at 14.
85. See Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 145, 149 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984); Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 229 (2003).
86. GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 83, at 23 tbl. 1. Under Section 4, jurisdictions were deemed
covered and subjected to special requirements if: (1) they conditioned voting on a test or some other
device and (2) less than half of the voting age population was either registered or actually voted in the
1964 presidential election. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2000); see also GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 83, at
16-17.
87. Derfner, supra note 83, at 149. The literacy test ban became permanent in 1975. GROFMAN
ET AL., supra note 83, at 21.
88. GROFMANETAL.,supra note 83, at 18, 22-23.
89. Id. at 21.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 20.
92. Id. at 20-21.
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VRA was successful in stopping many of the practices that had effectively denied
racial minorities access to the ballot.
While dismantling direct impediments to participation was a necessary
precondition to equal voting rights, it was not sufficient.93 The second generation
of VRA enforcement focused on vote dilution-that is, on practices that diminish
minorities' voting strength where they were permitted to vote.94 Common vote
dilution practices included at-large elections, gerrymandered districts, majority-vote
requirements, anti-single-shot laws, annexation of outlying areas with
predominantly white populations, and replacement of elected officials with
appointed officials.95
Two legal developments were especially vital to the attack on dilutive practices.
One was the Supreme Court's opinion in Allen v. State Boardof Elections,96 which
held that Section 5 of the VRA reached "the subtle, as well as the obvious" state
practices that effectively denied the vote on account of race. 97 The Allen decision
invigorated the formerly sporadic enforcement of Section 5 of the VRA.98 Under
Section 5, covered jurisdictions must obtain "preclearance" of electoral changes
before they may take effect from either the U.S. Department of Justice or the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.99 To obtain preclearance, the
jurisdiction wishing to make a change must show that the change "does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color,"' 1°° a standard that the Supreme Court later interpreted to
prohibit "retrogression"--changes that would make racial minorities worse off than
they were before.'0 ' Allen clarified that Section 5 applies not only to practices
denying access to the ballot box, but also to more sophisticated efforts to weaken
minority voting strength.'° 2 Section 5 became especially important in attacking vote
dilution after the 1970 redistricting cycle because it placed the burden on covered
states and counties to show their proposed changes would not diminish racial
minorities' voting strength.'° 3
The other critical legal development in challenging vote dilution was
Congress's 1982 amendments to Section 2 of the VRA, which added the "results

93. See Karlan, supra note 14, at 122.
94. See id.
95. Id.; GROFMAN ET AL, supra note 83, at 24.
96. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
97. Id. at 565.
98. Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History,in CONTROVERSIES INMINORITY
VOTING 28-29 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
100. Id.
101. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976); see also Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.,
528 U.S. 320, 340 (2000) (holding Section 5's purpose prong applies only to practices that have a
retrogressive purpose, and not to those with a discriminatory but non-retrogressive purpose).
102. GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 83, at 24-25.
103. Id. at 29.
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test." Before 1980, the Court held that to establish a constitutional violation arising
from the use of multi-member districts, minority voters had the burden of showing
that "the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally
open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less
opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political
processes and to elect legislators of their choice."'" The Court applied that
standard in White v. Regester to hold that multi-member districts in a Texas plan
effectively undercut African Americans' and Mexican Americans' voting
strength." °5 Following White, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Zimmer v. McKeithen
struck down a Louisiana reapportionment that included at-large districts. 0 6 The
chief significance of White and Zimmer was that neither rested its holding on a
finding of discriminatory intent, instead concluding that the challenged at-large
election schemes violated the Constitution due to their impact on minority voting
strength.
In 1980, however, challenges to vote dilution hit a roadblock. In Mobile v.
Bolden,"°7 a plurality of the Court concluded that intentional discrimination was
necessary for an at-large election scheme to violate the Constitution.'0 8 At issue in
Bolden was an at-large election scheme for Mobile commissioners, under which all
voters throughout the city elected each of the commissioners.' 09 Due to the racial
polarization of the electorate and the fact that whites were a numerical majority,
blacks had been completely shut out of the commission."0 Bolden altered the
evidentiary standard established in White and Zimmer to require direct evidence of
discriminatory intent."' This requirement made it significantly more difficult for
minority voters to challenge election systems that effectively prevent them from
electing candidates of their choice." 2
In direct response to Bolden, Congress added the results test in the 1982
amendments to Section 2.' 1' The original version of Section 2 tracked the language
of the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibiting practices that deny or abridge the vote on
account of race.' In its place, the 1982 amendments provided:

104. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,766 (1973) (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149
(1971)).
105. Id. at 767-70.
106. Zimmer v. McKeithen 485 F.2d 1297, 1305-09 (5th Cir. 1973).
107. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
108. Id. at 65.
109. Id. at 59-60.
110. See Jennifer G. Presto, Note, The 1982 Amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:
ConstitutionalityAfter City of Boeme, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 609, 613 (2004).
111. Michael J. Pitts, CongressionalEnforcement of Affirmative Democracy Through Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act, 25 N. IL. U. L. REv. 185, 205 (2005).
112. Id.
113. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).
114. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 17 (1982), as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 194 ("Section
2 was designed to track the Fifteenth Amendment, whose wording it follows.").
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No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color. . ,"
Throughout the legislative debate over the 1982 amendments to Section 2,
Congress's focus was on vote dilution claims." 6 The House committee hearings
included only limited discussion of Section 2,"' but this section was a major focus
of the hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution of the

Committee on the Judiciary, of which Senator Orrin Hatch was chair.' 1 8 Those
hearings included nine days of testimony and fifty-one witnesses. The hearings
focused on whether replacing the Bolden test with a results test would effectively
mandate proportional representation-that is, the election of racial minorities in
numbers proportionate to their population." 9 The report from Senator Hatch's
subcommittee excerpted testimony from a string of conservative professors and

other experts who testified that courts would effectively interpret a results test as a
mandate for proportional representation or even quotas. 2 ° Future Chief Justice
John Roberts, then a lawyer in the Justice Department, also made this argument in
a memorandum asserting that the results test "would establish essentially a quota
system for electoral politics.'' Through a compromise brokered by Senator Bob
"
Dole 22
' and ultimately enacted, the 1982 amendments expressly disclaimed any right

115.

42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000) (emphasis added).
116. See Voting Rights Act: HearingsBefore the S. Subcomm. on the Constitutionof the Comm.
on the Judiciary,97th Cong. (1982) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. For a detailed discussion of the
legislative history to the 1982 amendments, see Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1983).
117. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
45 (Feb. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("[Tihe House Judiciary Committee voted
23-1 for a bill that inserted an explicit results test into Section 2, but included a provision stating that
a lack of proportional representation was not 'in and of itself proof of a violation.").
118. See Senate Hearings, supra note 116, at 1, 3 (statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman, S. Subcomm. on the Constitution); Presto, supra note 110, at 620 & n.56.
119. See Presto, supra note 110, at 621.
120. S.REP. No.97-417, at 139-47 (1982), as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 311-20; see
also Kousser, supra note 116, at 47 ("In their testimony, Administration witnesses and their
compatriots chanted one refrain: anything except Stewart's opinion in Bolden would lead inevitably
to the proportional representation of minorities, a horrifying specter to them, compared to the grossly
disproportionate over-representation of whites, which had always been the American way." (emphasis
omitted)).
121. Memorandum from John Roberts to the Attorney General 2 (Dec. 22, 1981) (emphasis
omitted), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-88-0498/
030-black-binderI/folderO30.pdf#page=9.
122. See Kousser, supra note 117, at 48.
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that the
to proportional representation.' 23 Senator Hatch nevertheless argued
24
representation.1
proportional
mandate
to
be
would
effect
amendment's
The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments listed seven factors
that it identified as "typical" of those which could be used to demonstrate that a
challenged practice denied minority voters "an equal opportunity to participate in
the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice."' 25 Derived from
White and Zimmer, the factors were:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state
or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of
the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate
in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or
political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, antisingle shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the
minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of
the minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state
or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such
areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their
ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt
or subtle racial appeals;
group have been
7. the extent to which members of the minority
26
elected to public office in the jurisdiction. 1

123. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000).
124. S.REP. No. 97-417, at 96 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 269 (statement
of Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on the Constitution) (arguing that, despite
disclaimer, amended Section 2 would entail a mandate for proportional representation).
125. Id. at 28-29, as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
126. Id. at 28-29, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07 (citations omitted).
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The Senate Report also identified two additional factors that have probative value
in some cases: "whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of
elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group,"
and "whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such
voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is
tenuous."' 127 The report noted that the Judiciary Committee meant to impose no
requirement that a plaintiff prove a majority or any other particular number of
factors to make out a case.'28 According to the Senate Report, the "ultimate test"
was "whether, in the particular situation, the practice operated to deny the minority
plaintiff an equal opportunity to participate and to elect candidates of their
choice." 129

Senator Hatch and other opponents of the results test were unpersuaded that this
list of considerations, now known as the "Senate factors," would eliminate the risk
of courts mandating proportional representation in vote dilution cases. 3 ' In his
separate statement accompanying the Senate Report, Senator Hatch pointedly asked
just what exactly the Senate factors were supposed to get at. 3 ' An intent standard,
in his view, would have furnished a "core value" according to which a court could
measure the evidence. By contrast, the results test in the amended version left it
unclear what Section 2's core value was. 132 Despite the express renunciation of
proportional representation in the text of the amended Section 2, Senator Hatch
expressed his belief that "[tlhere is no core value under the results test other than
election results. There is no core value that can lead anywhere other than toward
proportional representation by race and ethnic group."' 133 It was no answer, he
argued, to advert to the "totality of circumstances" or the Senate factors. 134 Such
evidence only explained the "scope of the evidence" that courts should consider in
Section 2 claims, but did not explain the "standardof evidence, the test or criteria
by which such evidence is assessed and evaluated."'' 35 In Senator Hatch's view,
discriminatory intent was both the appropriate core value and the standard of
evidence by which to measure violations of Section 2.136 The majority in Congress
did not, however, agree with Senator Hatch's view, at least with respect to the legal
standard, instead allowing a violation to be found on something less than a showing
of discriminatory intent.
The legislative history of the 1982 amendments thus shows that Congress was
almost exclusively focused on vote dilution claims, and particularly on whether

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 29, as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207.
Id. at 29, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207.
Id. S. REp. No. 97-417, at 30 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207.
Boyd & Markman, supra note 116, at 1398-99; Presto, supra note 110, at 621.
S. REP.No. 97-417, at 96, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 269.
Id. at 96, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 269.
Id. at 96, as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 269.
Id. at 96, as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 269.
Id. at 96, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 269.
Id. at 96, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 269.
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courts would read the amendments to require proportional representation. Although
the amended statute's plain language clearly indicates that the results test applies
to both vote denial and vote dilution claims, Congress's overwhelming concern was
with the latter. This is understandable because ending vote denial practices would
not create any risk of mandating proportional representation. On the other hand,
applying a disparate impact standard to dilution claims would create the risk of
mandating proportional representation. The results test was a compromise,
designed to extend Section 2 beyond cases where discriminatory intent could be
proven, without mandating proportional representation in vote dilution cases.
While Congress may not have been specific about the core value underlying the
amended Section 2, the Supreme Court has provided guidance as to the standard
governing claims under the 1982 amendments-or at least those claims alleging
vote dilution. Justice Brennan's opinion in Thornburg v. Gingles 37 set forth three
"preconditions" that a plaintiff must satisfy to make out a vote dilution claim under
Section 2: (1) "the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district;" (2) the group must be "politically cohesive;" and (3) there must be racial
bloc voting by whites, so as to defeat minority candidates. 138 Under this test,
assessing the degree of racial polarization is at the "heart" of Section 2 vote dilution
claims.139 Imposing these conditions prevented Section 2 from becoming a broad
mandate for proportional representation in vote dilution cases. In fact, avoiding
such a mandate was expressly part of Justice Brennan's reason for adopting these
preconditions. 4 0
The substantial majority of cases interpreting Section 2 have addressed issues
of vote dilution rather than vote denial. According to a comprehensive report of
the University of Michigan Law School's Voting Rights Initiative, there have been
a total of 322 lawsuits raising Section 2 claims for which rulings are available.' 4 '

137. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
138. Id. at 50-51.
139. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1833, 1851 (1992); see also Karlan, supra note 14,
at 126 (citing Professor Issachorroff and stating racial polarization is the "touchstone of a section 2
claim").
140. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17. But see id. at 85 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court's
definition of minority voting strength and its test for vote dilution results in the creation of a fight to
a form of proportional representation in favor of all geographically and politically cohesive minority
groups that are large enough to constitute majorities if concentrated within one or more single-member
districts.").
141. ELLEN KATZ ET AL., DOCUMENTING DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING: JUDICIAL FINDINGS UNDER

SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT SINCE 1982, at 8 (2005), available at
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/ votingrights/ files/finalreport.pdf. The report examined all rulings available
on Westlaw or LexisNexis. Id. Many Section 2 cases did not result in an opinion that is available on
one of these databases, and therefore are not included in the Michigan Voting Rights Initiative's report.
See NATIONAL COMM'N ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS: THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT AT WORK 1982-2005, at 84-85 (2006).
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Of those lawsuits, 145 involved challenges to at-large districts, 110 challenged
redistricting plans, and eleven challenged majority vote requirements 2-all of
which can safely be characterized as vote dilution rather than vote denial cases.
Only thirty-six cases challenged election procedures (such as registration practices,
candidacy, or voting requirements), and another thirty-six challenged other practices
(including annexations, felon disenfranchisement, and appointment practices)."'
Some, but not all of these, would be characterized as vote denial cases. While
some may disagree as to how to categorize some cases, it is clear that the
overwhelming majority of Section 2 lawsuits since 1982 have involved claims of
vote dilution and not vote denial.
B.

The New Generationof Vote Denial Claims

While Gingles and its progeny have generated a well-established standard for
vote dilution, a satisfactory test for vote denial cases under Section 2 has yet to
emerge. The language of Section 2 indicates that the results standard applies to vote
denial claims as well as vote dilution claims. The legislative history of the 1982
amendments, however, provides little guidance on how Section 2 should apply to
practices resulting in the disproportionate denial of minority votes. That is mainly
because Congress, especially the Senate, focused so intently on representation
rather than participation. Specifically, Congress wanted to overrule Bolden without
mandating proportional representation in dilution cases. So too, the Supreme
Court's seminal opinion in Gingles, as important as it is for vote dilution cases, is
of little use in vote denial cases; the preconditions the Supreme Court emphasized
in Gingles are tangential at best in assessing whether vote-denying practices violate
Section 2.
There are, however, a handful of lower court opinions addressing how Section
2 should apply to vote denial claims. In this Section, I focus on three branches of
vote denial cases that are particularly relevant to current debates over election
reform. The first branch consists of challenges to voting equipment like the
infamous "hanging chad" punch-card. The second branch deals with voter
identification requirements. The third branch involves voter qualifications-most
significantly, laws disenfranchising former felons. I conclude none of these
branches have articulated a wholly adequate test for evaluating these claims.
1.

Voting Equipment

Several cases have applied Section 2 to claims arising from the use of allegedly
substandard voting equipment, most notably the pre-scored punch-card system that

142. Id. at 8-9.
143. Id. at 9. Because some cases involved challenges to more than one election practice, the total
number of practices challenged does not add up to the total number of lawsuits. Id.
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gave rise to Florida's vote-counting crisis in the 2000 presidential election. In one
case brought long before the 2000 election, Roberts v. Wamser,'44 a candidate sued
under Section 2, alleging he lost an alderman election because the punch-card
voting system resulted in the disproportionate loss of black votes. 145 The district
court in Roberts concluded that, by failing to manually count ballots rejected by the
tabulating system, the board of elections had violated Section 2.146 The district
court's opinion did not make clear what the standard for Section 2 vote denial
claims should be. 14 7 Instead, the court applied the Gingles preconditions and
Senate factors, while expressly reserving the question of whether they must be
proven in a case challenging voting equipment. 48 The Eighth Circuit reversed for
149
lack of standing without addressing the merits.
Since the 2000 presidential election, there has been Section 2 litigation
regarding punch-card voting systems in five states. Cases in three of those states
have yielded published opinions." 0
The first published opinion on the issue was Common Cause v. Jones, in which
the district court allowed a Section 2 claim challenging California's punch-card
voting equipment to proceed past the pleading stage.15 1 In its abbreviated opinion,
the court concluded that the Gingles preconditions were irrelevant, and that the
plaintiffs' allegation that "racial minorities are disproportionately denied the right
to vote because their votes are uncounted in disproportionate numbers as a result
of
152
the voting mechanism that they are supplied" was sufficient to state a claim.
The next opinion to address the applicability of Section 2 to punch-card voting
equipment was Black v. McGuffage'53 from the Northern District of Illinois. In
Black, the court allowed a claim to proceed based on allegations of racial disparities
arising from the use of punch-card voting equipment, without addressing the
Gingles preconditions or the Senate factors. 154 The court held the allegation that
"voters residing in predominantly Latino and African American precincts where

144. 679 F. Supp. 1513 (E.D. Mo. 1987), rev'd on othergrounds, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989).
145. Id. at 1514-16.
146. Id. at 1531-32.
147. Id. at 1529.
148. Id. at 1529-32. Assuming that the Gingles preconditions had to be satisfied in order to
challenge election procedures, the district court found that the black population was sufficiently large,
geographically compact, politically cohesive, and subject to bloc voting by whites, thus meeting those
preconditions. Id. at 1530.
149. Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617, 624 (8th Cir. 1989).
150. See Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Black v. McGuffage, 209
F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill.
2002); Common Cause v. Jones,' 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
151. Common Cause, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
152. Id. The parties in Common Cause subsequently stipulated to replacement of punch-card
voting equipment, and the district court concluded it was feasible to replace this equipment in time for
the 2004 elections. Id. at 1111-12.
153. 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. I1. 2002).
154. Id. at 896-97.
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punch-card machines are utilized, bear a greater risk that their
votes will not be
155
counted than do other voters" was sufficient to state a claim.
The third case to address the applicability of Section 2 to punch-card voting
equipment was Stewart v. Blackwell.156 In that case, Ohio voters brought a Section
2 claim arising from that state's continuing use of punch-card voting equipment."'
After a bench trial that included evidence of higher rates of overvotes and
undervotes in black precincts than in predominantly non-black ones, the district
court rejected the voters' claims. 5 8 The court's cursory discussion of Section 2
distinguished between vote denial and vote dilution claims, recognizing that the
case was an instance of the former, but failed to articulate a standard to govern such
claims. 159 The court concluded there was no "'actual' denial of the right to vote on
account of race," because "[a]ll voters in a county, regardless of race, use the same
voting system to cast a ballot,
and no one is denied the opportunity to cast a valid
160
vote because of their race."'
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit became the first appellate court to rule on the
merits of a Section 2 claim challenging the disparate impact of voting equipment on
minority voters. 16' That court concluded that the district court misconstrued the
requirements of Section 2.162 Citing prior circuit precedent, the Sixth Circuit noted
that Section 2 plaintiffs "'need show only that the challenged action or requirement
has a discriminatory effect on members of a protected group."" 6 3 According to the
Sixth Circuit, Section 2 encompasses not only polling place access but also the right
to have one's vote counted on equal terms"6 On remand, the Sixth Circuit ordered
the district court to consider the "voluminous" statistical evidence showing a

155. Id. at 897.
156. 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004), rev'd, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10027 (6th Cir.
2006).
157. Id. at 792.
158. Id. at 809, 816.
159. Id. at 807-08.
160. Id. at 808.
161. The Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion in Southwest Voter RegistrationEducation Project v.
Shelley, 344 F.3d 94 (9th Cir. 2003)-the litigation seeking to postpone the California recall-briefly
addressed the Section 2 issue but did not squarely rule on the merits. Id. at 918-19. The court instead
rested on the deferential standard applicable to preliminary injunctions and the harm to the State of
California that would result from postponing an election already begun. Id. at 919-20. The Ninth
Circuit indicated the plaintiffs had made a stronger showing on the VRA claim than on its equal
protection claim. Id. at 918. The court noted, however, that there was a factual dispute "as to the
degree and significance of the disparity" arising from punch-card voting and thus concluded the district
court acted within its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction. Id. at 918-19.
162. Stewart v. Blackwell, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10027, at *95 (6th Cir. 2006).
163. Id. (quoting Moore v. DetroitSch. Reform Bd., 293 F.3d 352, 363 (6th Cir. 2002)).
164. Id.
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correlation between over-voting and the percentage of African Americans in a

precinct.165
While these decisions provide only limited guidance on the standard applicable
to Section 2 cases challenging racial disparities arising from voting equipment, the
Sixth Circuit's opinion in Stewart is the most illuminating so far. That court
quoted Gingles for the proposition that "the essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain
electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to
cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect
their preferred representatives. ' Itwas therefore no answer to a Section 2 claim,
in the Sixth Circuit's view, to assert that "socioeconomic conditions, not race"
account for the disparity in lost votes.' 67 The interaction between socioeconomic
inequalities and the use of a particular voting system -far from defeating a Section
2 vote denial claim-instead supports support that claim, at least where (a) there are
background racial inequalities with respect to education or other socioeconomic
factors, and (b) those inequalities result in a disparity in the percentage of votes
68
counted.'
2.

Voter Identification

An emerging area of election administration that can be expected to receive
considerable attention in years to come is the disparate impact of ballot security
measures on racial minorities. This issue has recently come to the fore due to
efforts in several states to implement laws requiring voters to show photo ID in
order to have their votes counted. 169 But thus far, the case law applying Section 2
to voter ID requirements is sparse and unenlightening, at least with respect to the
70
legal standard applicable to such claims.
In United States v. Berks County,' 7' a Pennsylvania district court considered
inconsistencies in the manner of obtaining identification from voters, which the
plaintiffs alleged had a disparate impact on Latino voters. 72 Citing the
socioeconomic disparities affecting Latino voters, the relatively small number of

165. Id. Judge Gilman dissented from the panel's conclusion on the Section 2 claim. He
acknowledged that the district court's ruling could have been "more thorough," but was "not convinced
that the [district] court reached an erroneous conclusion." Id. at *157.
166. Id. at *101 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47).
167. Id.
168. For further discussion of Section 2's applicability to voting equipment, see Richard B.
Saphire & Paul Moke, The Voting Rights Act and the Racial Gap in Lost Votes (Oct. 23, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1743-44.
169. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
170. For scholarly commentary on recent voter identification proposals, see Spencer A. Overton,
Voter Identification (March 21, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
171. 277 F. Supp. 2d 570 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
172. Id. at 573 (noting officials "treated Hispanic voters differently than other voters with regard
to voter identification requirements").
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Latinos represented as poll workers, and the "severe" impact of hostility toward
Latinos evident in the conduct of some poll officials, the court concluded the
plaintiffs had established a violation of Section 2.73 The evidence of overt hostility
toward Latinos makes Berks County a relatively easy case, and it sheds little light
on how the results test would apply to cases in which poll officials impose an
identification requirement without hostility toward a particular racial or ethnic
group-but in a manner that still has a racially disparate impact.
Only one case has considered the application of Section 2 to a law requiring all
voters to show photo ID to vote.' 7 4 In Common Cause/Georgiav. Billups, 175 the

district court granted a preliminary injunction against Georgia's 2005 voter ID law,
basing its conclusion on constitutional grounds.'76 But the court concluded that the
plaintiffs had failed to show a substantial likelihood of prevailing on their Section
2 claim. 7 7 The court recognized that Section 2 applies to vote denial as well as to
vote dilution, and cited Gingles' recitation of the Senate factors. 77 And like
Stewart v. Blackwell, it also quoted Gingles for the proposition that "'[tlhe essence
of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with
social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed
by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives." 179 While noting
the plaintiffs' evidence of socioeconomic disparities between blacks and whites, as
well as disparities in access to a vehicle, the court concluded that this evidence was
insufficient to warrant preliminary injunctive relief on plaintiffs' Section 2 claim. 80
The apparent basis for the Common Cause/Georgiacourt's conclusion is that
the plaintiffs, while producing evidence of disparities in access to a vehicle, had not
actually produced evidence of racial disparities in the possession of drivers' licenses
or other forms of photo ID. It thus remains an open question whether a Section 2
claim would lie where plaintiffs produced evidence that racial minorities are less
likely to possess a government-issued photo ID and therefore would be more
18
severely affected by the requirement that voters produce such identification.'
3.

Voter Qualifications

173. Id. at 581. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited Harris v.Graddick,593 F. Supp. 128
(M.D. Ala. 1984), which also involved evidence of the underrepresentation of minorities-in that case
blacks-as poll workers and of discrimination at the polls. See id. at 131-32.
174. Indiana's photo ID requirement has also been the subject of a legal challenge, which a
federal district court rejected. See Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20321, at
*1-8 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 14, 2006). There was, however, no Section 2 claim in that case.
175. 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
176. Id.at 1376.
177. Id.at 1375.
178. Id.at 1373 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,44-45 (1986)).
179. Id.at 1374 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47).
180. Id.at 1374-75.
181. See Pawasarat, supra note 66 (finding racial disparities in Wisconsin in the possession of
drivers' licenses).
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The most thorough consideration of Section 2's applicability to vote denial has
occurred in cases challenging voting qualifications, particularly laws denying voting
rights to felons. So far, none of these cases have resulted in a final judgment for
plaintiffs,8 2 though one circuit has issued a ruling allowing a Section 2 claim to
proceed.m83

The first cases challenging felon disenfranchisement laws under Section 2 were
unsuccessful.' 84 In Wesley v. Collins,15 the Sixth Circuit rejected a challenge to
Tennessee's felon disenfranchisement law, on the ground that disparate impact
alone was insufficient to make out a Section 2 claim. 86 The court concluded that
the Tennessee statute did not deny felons the right to vote based on some
"immutable characteristic," but instead on the "conscious decision" to commit a
crime. 187 Its reasoning appears to be that felons' choice to engage in criminal
activity, rather than the "qualification of the right to vote on account of race or
color," caused the disproportionate denial of black votes.18 This rationale is
suspect at best, however, because Section 2 is not limited to facially race-based
distinctions nor to ones that rest on immutable characteristics. Nor is a practice
excluded from Section 2's scope merely because it depends upon voters' choices.
Were that the case, then redistricting plans that dilute minority votes would also be
excepted from Section 2 since those plans also depend on voters' choices-in that
case, of where to live.
The Second Circuit has twice considered the applicability of Section 2 to felon
disenfranchisement laws but has also failed to come up with a satisfactory test.
However, as of this writing, the court has yet to definitively resolve the issue. In
Baker v. Pataki,8 9 the court considered a challenge to New York's felon
disenfranchisement law' 19' The en banc court was evenly divided over whether to

allow the plaintiffs' Section 2 claim to proceed, resulting in affirmance of the
district court's order dismissing the case. 19' Five judges concluded that the
application of Section 2's results test to criminal disenfranchisement laws would
raise serious constitutional questions.192 The other five believed that the results test

182. KATZ ET AL., supra note 141, at 9.
183. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F. 3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
184. See Karlan, supra note 70, at 1147 & n.1.
185. 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
186. Id. at 1260-61.
187. Id. at 1261-62.
188. Id. at 1262.
189. 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
190. Id. at 920-21.
191. Id. at 921.
192. Id. at 930. Those five judges rested their conclusion on Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides in pertinent part:
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President
and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
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should apply to these cases.1 93 Because the court was evenly split, the decision has
no precedential effect.' 94

The Second Circuit recently revisited the disenfranchisement issue in Muntaqim
v. Coombe. 9 5 In Muntaqim, a three-judge panel sided with the five judges from
196
Baker who rejected the applicability of Section 2 to felon disenfranchisement.
The panel reasoned that Section 2, if read to prohibit racial disparities arising from
felon disenfranchisement, would upset the constitutional balance between the
federal government and the states. 197 It therefore rejected that interpretation of
Section 2 absent a "clear statement" from Congress.' 9" Given that no such statement
existed in Section 2 or its legislative history, the panel declined to read Section 2's
results test to encompass New York's felon disenfranchisement law. 99 After the
panel opinion, however, the Second Circuit granted plaintiffs' petition for
rehearing, 2' and the case remains pending before the en banc court as this article
goes to press.

Two other circuits have addressed the applicability of Section 2 to felon
disenfranchisement, reaching conclusions that are difficult, if not impossible, to
20 2
reconcile with one another.20 ' In Johnson v. Governor of Florida,
the en banc

Eleventh

Circuit rejected

a Section

2

challenge

to Florida's

felon

disenfranchisement statute. 20 3 Like the three-judge panel in Muntaqim, the Johnson

majority concluded that applying Section 2 to felon disenfranchisement laws would
raise serious constitutional questions.2" The court based its conclusion on the
"'congruence and proportionality"' standard articulated in City ofBoerne v. Flores

years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, exceptfor
participationin rebellion,orothercrime,the basis of representation therein shall

be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear
to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). The "majority" read this provision to authorize the
disenfranchisement of ex-felons. Baker, 85 F.3d at 929. But see Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction,Felon
Disenfranchisement,and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the

FourteenthAmendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259,272-75 (2004) (arguing the Fifteenth Amendment repealed
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and provided a stronger proscription against racial
discrimination in voting).
193. Baker v. Patak, 85 F.3d 919, 936-38 (2d Cir. 1996).
194. See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2004).
195. 366 F.3d 102.
196. Id. at 104.
197. Id. at 118-26.
198. Id. at 129.
199. Id. at 127-28.
200. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 396 F.3d 95, 95 (2d Cir. 2004).
201. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (1lth Cir. 2005), cert. denied, Johnson v.
Bush, 126 S. Ct. 650 (2005); Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
202. 405 F.3d 1214.
203. Id. at 1234.
204. Id. at 1230.
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and its progeny, as well as the "absence of congressional findings that 'felon
disenfranchisement laws were used to discriminate against minority voters. 205
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit allowed a Section 2 claim challenging
Washington State's felon disenfranchisement law to proceed in Farrakhan v.
Washington.2 °6 Reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
state, the Ninth Circuit concluded that felon disenfranchisement was a form of vote
denial subject to Section 2. "Felon disenfranchisement is a voting qualification, and
Section 2 is clear that any voting qualification that denies citizens the right to vote
in a discriminatory manner violates the VRA. ' ' 20 7 In the Ninth Circuit's view, the
critical question was not simply whether there was racially discriminatory
motivation for the felon disenfranchisement law, but whether it "interact[ed] with
surrounding racial discrimination in a meaningful way., 20 8 While recognizing that
the disparate impact of a voting practice is not sufficient, in itself, to establish a
Section 2 claim,20 9 the court held that the existence of discrimination in the state's
criminal justice system should be considered as a part of the totality of
circumstances. 21 ° The court further recognized it should consider disparate impact,
even though it is not specifically listed as one of the Senate factors.21'
In reaching this conclusion, the Farrakhancourt distinguished Smith v. Salt
River ProjectAgriculturalImprovement, a prior Ninth Circuit case that had upheld

a property ownership qualification for voting in agricultural improvement district
elections. 1 2 While that court found evidence of disparities in property ownership
between whites and blacks,
it did not find evidence that these disparities arose from
"racial discrimination. 2, 3 Taken together, Smith and Farrakhansuggest that a
Section 2 vote denial claim arises where discrimination outside the voting process
interacts with the challenged practice to result in the disproportionate denial of
minority votes. While such a showing may be sufficient to prove a claim (or at least
to survive summary judgment), it is not clear whether the court believed such
evidence was necessary to make out a claim.
The Ninth Circuit subsequently denied rehearing en banc in Farrakhan,over
the vigorous dissent of Judge Kozinski and six other judges.214 Judge Kozinski's
dissent is worthy of attention because it exposes the analytical difficulty at the heart
of Section 2 vote denial claims. While acknowledging "intentional discrimination

205. Id. at 1230-31 (quoting City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
206. 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
207. Id. at 1016.
208. Id. at 1018.
209. Id. at 1019.
210. Id. at 1019-20.
211. Id. at 1020.
212. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016-19 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Smith v. Salt
River Project Agric. Improvement, 109 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1997)).
213. Id. at 1017.
214. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004).
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external to voting" may be taken into account in Section 2 cases, 215 Judge Kozinski
concluded that the plaintiffs did not present any evidence of intentional
discrimination.216 Instead, the plaintiffs' arguments rested entirely on statistical
evidence of a disparate racial impact. 217 By allowing plaintiffs' claim to proceed
based on nothing more than "'a bare statistical showing of disproportionate
impact, '-218 in Judge Kozinski's view, the panel interpreted Section 2 in a way that
rendered the statute "constitutionally questionable. ' 219 To interpret Section 2 as
reaching any felon disenfranchisement laws having a disparate impact, he argued,
runs afoul of Boerne's congruence and proportionality test. 220 Moreover, Judge
Kozinski opined that if the court's interpretation was correct, then practices such as
internet voting probably violate Section 2 because they have a disparate impact on
minorities due to the racial disparities in access to a computer.221
In one sense, the disagreement between Judge Kozinski and the panel in
Farrakhanis quite narrow. Both appear to agree that a voting qualification does
not violate Section 2 merely because it has a disparate impact on racial minorities.
And both appear to agree that evidence of intentional discrimination externalto the
voting process that interacts with the challenged practice may give rise to a claim.
They also appear to agree that the Ginglespreconditions are irrelevant to a Section
2 vote denial claim. Where they differ is over whether Congress meant to include
felon disenfranchisement within the scope of Section 2 and, more broadly, over the
scope of Congress's authority in remedying constitutional violations in the realm
of voting.
What these opinions-like other Section 2 vote denial cases-leave unclear is
precisely what the statute prohibits when it comes to voter qualifications or other
practices that result in vote denial. While the opinions agree that a Section 2 vote
denial claim requires something more than a mere disparate impact, what exactly
that "something more" should consist of is debatable. This stems from the fact that,
in Senator Hatch's words, the core value underlying Section 2's results test is less
than completely transparent. Is the statute aimed solely at intentional discrimination
in the voting process, as Senator Hatch thought it should be? Or does it more
broadly prohibit practices that have a disproportionate impact on minorities' ability
to vote and have their votes counted? If neither disparate impact nor discriminatory
intent is the standard for assessing Section 2 vote denial claims, as some of the cases
suggest, then what is the proper standard? That is the riddle of vote denial. The
answer to this riddle must not only provide the means for analyzing vote denial

215. Id.at 1119.
216. Id. at 1117.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1118 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith, 109 F.3d at 595) (emphasis removed).
219. Id. at 1116-17.
220. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
221. Id. at 1125-26.
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claims in the context of felon disenfranchisement but also guidance for expected
challenges to other practices such as the use of voter identification, voting
equipment, and even internet voting. 22
IV. SECTION 2 AND THE NEW VOTE DENIAL

The attention to matters of election administration since the 2000 presidential
election highlights the pressing need for judicial clarity on what showing must be
made to establish a Section 2 violation in vote denial cases. As Part II showed,
neither the legislative history of the 1982 amendments nor the Gingles opinion
provide much guidance on this question. And as the cases discussed in Part III
demonstrate, the lower courts have also struggled to define the legal standard to
evaluate vote denial claims.
As I explain below, there are good reasons for applying a different test in vote
denial cases than the one applied in vote dilution cases. The test that I recommend
borrows from the burden-shifting analysis applied in employment discrimination
cases under Title VH as well as in jury selection cases under the Equal Protection
Clause. Under this test, a plaintiff could make a prima facie case by showing the
challenged practice is a "but for" cause of racial disparity in voting. The state or
local entity would still have the opportunity to demonstrate this practice is necessary
to achieve a compelling government interest. While the outcome of this test may not
always be clear, this burden-shifting test will at least ensure courts take into account
the appropriate factors in Section 2 vote denial cases. After showing how this test
might be applied to some election administration issues that are likely to arise in
coming years, I explain why Section 2 would not exceed Congress's enforcement
powers if such a test were applied.
A.

Why DenialIs Different

Vote denial cases are different from vote dilution cases. The most obvious
difference is that next-generation vote denial cases, like first-generation vote denial
cases, mainly implicate the value of participation; by contrast, second-generation
cases involving vote dilution mainly implicate the value of aggregation.223 The cases
that I have grouped together under the rubric of "new vote denial" may in this sense
be seen as a throwback to the early days of voting rights enforcement. Like those
early cases, and unlike second-generation cases, the new vote denial cases involve

222. Felon disenfranchisement might be considered different than other forms of vote denial
because it arguably enjoys express constitutional authorization in Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 1121 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("[F]elon disenfranchisement laws are explicitly
endorsed by the text of the Fourteenth Amendment."). Nonetheless, the problem of formulating an
adequate vote denial test exists for other qualifications and election practices that disproportionately
exclude racial minorities.
223. See supra note 15.
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practices that disproportionately exclude minority voters from participating in the
electoral process at all. That is not to deny that vote-denying practices may also
have an impact on minorities' ability to elect representatives of their choice. The
point is that both first- and new-generation vote denial cases implicate the value of
participation, and not merely the value of aggregation.
To be sure, there are significant differences between the new vote denial cases
and the cases decided by the Warren Court in the 1960s and 1970s. Foremost
among those differences was that the existence of intentional race discrimination
was much more obvious in the earlier generation. But while hindsight has benefits,
it may also obscure some of the similarities between the first and new generation of
vote denial cases. Election officials (then as now) commonly denied that racial bias
was the reason for these barriers, and incumbents advancing vote denial measures
(then as now) were motivated by a desire to protect their own power, not just by
racial animus.224
Any discriminatory intent underlying present-day vote denial practices such as
ID requirements, voting technology, and felon disenfranchisement is of course less
obvious. That is partly because times have changed since the VRA' s enactment in
the 1960s.225 But it is also because government actors nowadays are less likely to
admit that intentional discrimination underlies their actions, even where it is part of
the rationale for adopting or retaining a particular practice. Have the Republicandominated legislatures in Georgia and Indiana adopted the nation's most restrictive
voter ID measures because they know that black voters (who generally vote
Democrat) will be among those most severely affected? Was this, in whole or in
part, their intent in enacting the law? Because legislators are extremely unlikely2 to
26
admit such motivations, proving that discriminatory intent exists is very difficult.
For this reason, it is important to distinguish two concepts that Senator Hatch
conflated in opposing the 1982 amendments: the core value of Section 2's results
test and the legal standardthat should be applied under it. Even if one agrees with
Senator Hatch that the only core value underlying Section 2 is the eradication of

224. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE 122-34, 324-27, 359-63 (1999);
Kousser, supra note 117, at 91 (stating that "voting discrimination even in the nineteenth century was
much more concerned with racial power than with racial antagonism, and politicians and their lawyers
can nearly always find other plausible reasons for adopting discriminatory laws-fighting fraud,
protecting incumbents or partisan interests, punishing criminals").
225. See Richard L. Hasen, CongressionalPowerto Renew the PreclearanceProvisionsof the
Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 188 (2005) (referring to the "Bull
Connor is Dead problem"); Abigail Thernstrom & Edward Blum, Do the Right Thing, WALLST. J., July
15, 2005, at A10 (arguing that Congress should allow Section 5 to expire because "[t]imes have
changed" in the Deep South since the 1960s).
226. See LICHTMAN, supranote 42, at 3; Saphire & Moke, supranote 168, at 5-19; Tokaji, supra
note 6, at 1760-67; Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 42, at 47-49; (finding "blacks were far more
likely than non-blacks to have their ballots rejected"); but see Berman Memorandum, supra note 65,
at 9 (reporting the sponsor of the Georgia ID bill "said that when black voters in her black precincts
are not paid to vote, they do not go to the polls," and thus any decrease in black voting indicates only
a decrease in fraud).
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intentional discrimination, it does not follow that Section 2 plaintiffs should be
required to prove intentional discrimination in order to make out a claim-or, put
in his words, that intentional discrimination should be the "standardof evidence."
While Senator Hatch was correct to identify the prevention of intentional
discrimination as the core value underlying Section 2,227 he was wrong to rule out
an impact-based legal standard as a way of getting at that core value. An impactbased test may serve as a prophylactic against intentional discrimination that might
otherwise seep into the voting process undetected.228
Even if it is clear that intentional discrimination did not underlie the original
decision to enact a certain practice, it may be responsible for the decision not to
eliminate that practice. For example, some members of a predominantly white
legislature might have less motivation to eliminate an existing criminal
disenfranchisement law that has a disparate impact on blacks, notwithstanding the
fact that the intent to disenfranchise minorities played no discernible part in the
original enactment of that law. So too, discriminatory intent may partially underlie
the decision not to replace punch-card voting equipment that has a disparate impact
on black voters, even if it did not motivate the original decision to purchase that
equipment. Because discriminatory intent will be extremely difficult to prove in
such cases, especially when governmental inaction is at issue, some form of an
impact-based legal standard is necessary.
The inherent difficulty of proving intentional discrimination in modem-day vote
voting disputes therefore supports the application of a disparate impact test, even
if stopping intentional discrimination is the one and only "core value" served by
Section 2. The problem is that Congress deliberately eschewed a simple disparate
impact test when it amended the VRA in 1982. This, however, is largely due to the
fact that Congress was so single-mindedly focused on vote dilution rather than on
vote denial when it amended Section 2, even though the results test applies to both
types of practices under the amendment's plain language. The difficulty in ferreting
out intentional discrimination, of course, exists with respect to both vote denial and
vote dilution. But there are two important differences that together warrant a
different analysis-one that is closer to a simple disparate impact test-when it
comes to vote denial.
The first difference is that discerning whether a disparate impact exists is
generally more straightforward in vote denial claims than in vote dilution claims.
The Gingles preconditions and some of the Senate factors serve the function of
helping to assess whether a particular practice actually has a dilutive effect on racial

227. While I agree with Senator Hatch on the core value Section 2 serves, one must keep in mind
that the distinction between discriminatory intent and disparate impact is often more formal than real,
especially in voting cases. See, e.g., Daniel Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection,41 STAN.
L. REv. 1105, 1126 (1989) (applying the intent doctrine to the electoral process and finding "[t]he
intent doctrine in voting cases bears even less relationship to motivation"); Kousser, supra note 117,
at 52-53 (discussing "how closely related evaluations of intent and effect were").
228. See supra note 224-26 and accompanying text.
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minorities. Consider, for example, racial polarization and geographic compactness.
Both of these factors are critical to ascertaining whether a particular electoral
scheme, such as an at-large system or redistricting plan, weakens racial minorities'
collective influence in comparison to other possible schemes. In vote dilution cases,
it is essential that the court examine this sort of circumstantial evidence in assessing
whether a particular electoral scheme diminishes minorities' voting strength
compared to other feasible alternatives.
A court does not need to rely on such circumstantial evidence, however, when
there is direct evidence that an electoral practice has the result of disproportionately
denying minority votes. With respect to felon disenfranchisement laws, for
example, the result may be shown by establishing that racial minorities are
incarcerated, and thus disenfranchised, at higher rates than whites.2 2 9 With respect
to voting equipment, a plaintiff could establish this result by showing that a
particular type of voting machine, such as the pre-scored punch-card, results in
more black votes being thrown out than white votes compared to alternative voting
technologies. 230 The size of minority populations, their geographical compactness,
and racial bloc voting are irrelevant to measuring the impact of such practices on
minority participation. It is therefore quite appropriate that lower courts have
mostly disregarded these factors in Section 2 vote denial cases.
Although the results test is more straightforward in vote denial cases than in
vote dilution cases, the relative simplicity of proving disparate impact in vote denial
cases also creates a conundrum. Courts have struggled to avoid the conclusion that
Section 2 is violated in any case where the challenged practice has a disparate
impact on minority votes. Some decisions have avoided this conclusion by
manipulating the "causation" requirement.2
In Wesley v. Collins,232 for example,
the court avoided the conclusion that Tennessee's felon disenfranchisement law
violated Section 2 by attributing the vote denial to the individual's choice to commit
a crime, even though the vote denial would not have occurred but for the
exclusionary law.233
In other cases, like Farrakhan,the courts have limited Section 2 through an
"impact-plus" test for vote denial claims. Both the panel's opinion and Judge

229. See Uggen & Manza, supra note 7, at 780-81.
230. See LICHTMAN, supranote 42, at 3. Saphire & Moke, supra note 168, at 5-19; Tokaji, supra
note 6, at 1760-67; Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 42, at 47-49 (finding "blacks were far more
likely than non-blacks to have their ballots rejected").
231. See Saphire & Moke, supra note 168, at 39-52.
232. 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
233. Id. at 1261-62; see also Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306, 313-14 (3d Cir. 1994)
(rejecting Section 2 claim challenging the state's purge law and reasoning the law did not cause
disparate levels of voter turnout); John A. Earnhardt, Note, Challenging Episodic Practices Under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: CriticalAnalysis of Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of the City
Commissioners Voting Registration Division, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1065, 1095-1100 (1995)

(criticizing Ortiz); Saphire & Moke, supra note 168, at 47-55 (analyzing Ortiz opinion's discussion

of causation).
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Kozinski's dissent required something more than a mere disparate impact to make
out a Section 2 claim.2 34 The Farrakhanmajority found the required "something
more" in discrimination outside the voting system that interacts with the challenged
practice. 235 Judge Kozinski agreed, at least insofar as discrimination is understood
to mean intentional discrimination, but concluded that statistical evidence of
disparate impact cannot suffice.236 He would instead require additional evidence of

intentional discrimination outside the voting process that interacts with the
challenged practice to produce a disparate racial impact. 237 This requirement
makes little sense, however, if the results test is supposed to serve as a prophylactic
against voting practices-such as felon disenfranchisement or voter ID-adopted
or retained due to intentional discrimination that would be difficult to prove in
court. Such intent may exist whether or not there has been intentional
discrimination external to the voting process.
Nevertheless, the causation and impact-plus tests adopted in these cases do
serve a function, albeit awkwardly. By requiring something more than mere
disparate impact to make out a Section 2 claim, the tests allow judges to consider
the justifications the government proffers for adopting or keeping the voting
practice in question. In felon disenfranchisement cases, these tests permit
consideration of the penological justifications the state has for adopting the
challenged practice. The causation and impact-plus requirements allow, in other
words, a sort of under-the-table balancing of the government's interest in the
challenged practice against its vote-denying impact.
This leads to the second reason why vote denial claims are qualitatively
different from vote dilution claims. Congress had a good reason for avoiding a
simple disparate-impact standard in the context of vote dilution cases: to prevent
Section 2 from being read as a mandate for proportional representation. But that
rationale is entirely absent in vote denial cases. Suppose, for example, a plaintiff
could make a prima facie case of vote dilution by showing that a particular
apportionment scheme had the effect of underrepresenting black voters. How
would a court measure such an impact? The most obvious way to measure this
impact is comparing the percentage of "safe" black seats to the percentage of blacks
in the jurisdiction. It is not difficult to see how such a test could lead to a
requirement of proportional representation. As I have already explained, the danger
of proportional representation was the Senate's main concern when it debated
whether to implement a results test in 1982, and this concern led to the Dole
compromise, the Senate factors, and ultimately to the Gingles preconditions.23
Whatever dangers of proportional representation exist in applying a disparateimpact standard to vote dilution cases, they do not exist at all in vote denial cases.

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See supra notes 206-21 and accompanying text.
Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1119.
See supra Part III.A.
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For example, allowing a plaintiff to make a prima facie against a voter ID law by
showing the law has a more severe effect on black voters than on white voters is a
far cry from requiring proportional representation. Thus, the concerns that led
Congress to avoid a simple disparate-impact standard in vote dilution cases are not
germane to vote denial claims.
B. A New Vote Denial Test

The differences between vote denial and vote dilution cases provide a strong
argument for courts applying something closer to a simple disparate-impact test in
vote denial cases. I recommend a disparate-impact test, modeled on the one
applied in employment discrimination cases under Title VII.23 9 My test also
borrows from jury discrimination cases under the Equal Protection Clause.24 ° In this
Section, I describe the test that courts should consider adopting in new vote denial
cases and suggest how it would apply in a few key areas.

As I have already explained, there are compelling reasons for constructing a
different Section 2 test for vote denial claims than for vote dilution claims. 241
Foremost among those reasons is the relative simplicity of measuring disparate
impact in vote denial cases and the absence of proportional representation concerns.
Applying a disparate-impact test to vote denial cases, however, is not without its
problems. I have already mentioned one problem: the need to create a test that
considers the state's interests in the challenged practice."' The other problem is

that Congress, when it amended Section 2 in 1982, did not label the test it created
as a disparate-impact test.243 But as I explained earlier this omission is attributable
to the fact that Congress was preoccupied with vote dilution-and specifically with

239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000) (codifying the shifting of the burden of proof from a plaintiff
to a defendant under the disparate-impact test in employment discrimination cases); see Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971) (describing how once a plaintiff shows a challenged employment
practice is "discriminatory in operation," the burden shifts to the employer to show a "business
necessity" for the challenged practice); see also Developments in the Law-Employment
Discrimination, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1568, 1580 (1996) ("Disparate impact cases involve neutral
employment policies, such as competency tests, that have the unintended effect of discriminating
against individuals who belong to a protected class."); Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact
Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 45 RUTGERs L. REV. 1011, 1020-21 (1993)
(describing the burden-shifting framework of the disparate-impact test, under which the burden of
persuasion shifts to the employer to demonstrate "business necessity" after a plaintiff shows a disparate
impact).
240. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) ("Once the defendant makes a prima facie
showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black
jurors.").
241. See supra Part W.A.
242. See supra Part [V.A.
243. See supra Part IV.A.
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avoiding a proportional representation mandate-when it amended Section 2 in
1982.24
While Congress focused mostly on vote dilution in 1982, the legislative history
provides some general guidance that is helpful in formulating a test for vote denial
cases. The Senate Report stated the "ultimate test" under Section 2 is "whether, in
the particular situation, the practice operated to deny the minority plaintiff an equal
opportunity to participate and to elect candidates of their [sic] choice. '245 The fifth
Senate factor is also instructive to vote denial cases: "the extent to which members
of the minority group ...bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as

education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process. 246 Notably, the Senate Report did not qualify
the type of discrimination a court should consider under the test-for example, a
court is not limited to considering "intentional discrimination" or "official
discrimination"-even though the intent/impact distinction and the public/private
distinction were both firmly established components of constitutional law by 1982.
The Supreme Court amplified the fifth factor in Gingles, stating the "essence of a
§ 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social
and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
'
black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives." 247
Here again,
Section 2 plaintiffs are not required to demonstrate intentional discrimination, much
less intentional discrimination on the part of state actors, to make out a claim.
Still, these characterizations should cause hesitation in making disparate impact
alone sufficient to make out a prima facie case under Section 2. Instead, a plaintiff
should be required to show both (1) that the practice challenged results in the
disproportionate denial of minority votes (i.e., that it has a disparate impact on
minority voters); and (2) that this disparate impact is traceable to the challenged
practice's interaction with social and historical conditions. These might be thought
of as "preconditions" to Section 2 vote denial claims, analogous to the three Gingles
preconditions for Section 2 vote dilution claims. In cases challenging voting
equipment, for example, Section 2 plaintiffs could make out a prima facie case by
showing that past discrimination in education caused the higher rate of invalid votes
that racial minorities cast using certain types of equipment.248 In a case challenging
a photo ID requirement, a plaintiff could make a prima facie case by showing that
discrimination in areas such as employment have resulted in fewer blacks having
automobiles, or that housing discrimination led to larger numbers of blacks living
in urban neighborhoods in which a vehicle, and thus a driver's license, is

244. See supra Part II.A.
245. S. REP. No. 94-417, at 30 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207.
246. Id. at 29, as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206.
247. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (emphasis added).
248. For a discussion of the potential causes for the correlation between the use of certain voting
equipment and the increase in the number of African Americans who cast invalid votes, see Tomz &
Van Houweling, supra note 42.
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unnecessary. Plaintiffs could then use this evidence to show the photo ID
requirement disproportionately burdens blacks because it prevents many more
blacks from voting than it does whites.
This still leaves the problem of providing the state or a local defendant with the
opportunity to show the necessity of the challenged practice, despite its disparate
impact on racial minorities. This corresponds to one of the two "[a]dditional
factors" noted in the Senate Report: "whether the policy underlying the state or
political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice or procedure is tenuous."24 9 Unlike most of the other Senate

factors, this factor seems quite germane to vote denial cases because of its focus on
"qualification[s]" and "prerequisite[s]" to voting, among other things.25 °
Once the plaintiffs make a prima facie disparate-impact case by producing
evidence of the two elements identified above, the burden should shift to the
defendant to justify the challenged practice.25 1 In a case challenging a voter ID
requirement, for example, the burden would shift to the state to demonstrate the
challenged practice is necessary to curb voting fraud. Just as employers in Title VII
cases must show that a challenged employment practice is justified by a "business
necessity," state and local election officials would have to show that a challenged
voting practice is justified by an "electoral necessity" once a prima facie disparateimpact case has been made. As in Title VII cases, defendants, appropriately, bear
the burden at this stage because they are in the best position to explain why 2they
believe vote-denying practices are necessary to achieve some vital interest.
This burden-shifting also bears comparison to the test for assessing racial
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory strikes under Batson v. Kentucky. 53
Because Batson involved an equal protection claim, the showing required to
establish a violation in that case was discriminatory intent, and not merely a
discriminatory result as is the case under Section 2. But as Professor Daniel Ortiz
has observed, the equal protection test that the Court has applied in jury
discrimination cases is more relaxed than the intent test applied in Washington v.
Davis2 54 and its progeny. 255 Batson may thus be thought of us lying somewhere
249. S. REP. No. 97-417, at (1982), as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207.
250. Id. at 29, as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207.
25 1. A possible objection to my proposed test is that it would allow Section 2 claims to be made
in cases where the differential impact of a voting procedure is relatively slight. It might, for example,
seem unfair to apply Section 2 to a felon disenfranchisement law that disenfranchises twelve percent
of blacks and eleven percent of whites. This could be dealt with by requiring that any disparities be
statistically significant and by imposing a lower burden of justification on the state where the racial
disparity is de minimis.
252. See e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (establishing a business
necessity defense in a Title VII case).
253. 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
254. 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
255. See Ortiz, supra note 227, at 1122 (noting the "lighter burden on the individual" and
"heavier burden on the state" in jury selection cases, as opposed to employment and housing
discrimination cases).
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between an intent and an impact standard. 2 56 Under Batson's test, a criminal
defendant alleging jury discrimination must first provide evidence to raise an
inference of discrimination, such as a pattern of striking jurors of a particular
race. 25 7 The burden then shifts to the state to provide a "neutral explanation" for
striking the jurors in question.258 So too, I propose that where a Section 2 plaintiff
has made a prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden should shift to the state
or local entity to demonstrate a sufficient justification for the challenged practice.259
What should the government's burden be? I suggest that the government
should be required to show the challenged practice is narrowly tailored to a
compelling government interest. This high standard tracks that of constitutional
race discrimination claims and will prevent the government from asserting
pretextual justifications. One might argue for a lower standard (for example,
showing the standard is rationally related to legitimate interests) in cases where the
disparate impact on minority voters is relatively slight. But if state and local
election officials are to meet their burden merely by devising an argument that the
challenged practice is rational, it would be all too easy for pretextual justifications
to creep in. For this reason, I suggest that the government's burden be set at a
higher level than mere rationality.26 Whatever burden is imposed on the state, it is
critical that it be required to produce evidence, and not merely speculation, as to the
interests served by the challenged practice.
C. Is This Test Constitutional?
I have explained why vote denial cases warrant a different test from that applied
in vote dilution cases, and have suggested a test that would shift the burden from
Section 2 plaintiffs to defendants once a prima facie case of disparate impact is
shown. The question that remains is whether this test would be constitutional.
Developments in the Court's federalism jurisprudence and recent changes in the
Court's composition make the outcome of any case involving Congress's
constitutional enforcement powers difficult to determine with any confidence.
Although it is difficult to predict what the Court will do, I think that the Court

256. Id. at 1120-23.
257. Id. at 96-97.
258. Id. at 98; see Ortiz, supra note 227, at 1122 (describing burden-shifting under Batson and
the requirement that the prosecution cannot "merely deny that he had a discriminatory motive").
259. See Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306, 333-34 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (urging the
adoption of Title VII burden-shifting in Section 2 cases). But see Earnhardt, supra note 233, at
1102-03 (arguing Title VII burden-shifting would give too much power to Section 2 plaintiffs).
260. Alternatively, if the government were allowed to meet its burden with some lesser showing
than "narrowly tailored to a compelling interest," then the voting rights plaintiff should have an
opportunity to show that the proffered interest is pretextual, as in Title VII cases. This would prevent
government actors from attempting to hide behind invented justifications for practices that result in the
disproportionate denial of minority votes.
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should find the Section 2 test I have proposed to fall squarely within Congress's
power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.26'
Other commentators have more thoroughly addressed the impact of the
Supreme Court's "new federalism" cases on the VRA,262 so I will do so only briefly
here. In the line of decisions beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores,263 the Court
has applied the congruence and proportionality test in assessing the constitutionality
of laws in which Congress purports to exercise its authority to enforce Fourteenth
Amendment rights. 2" To satisfy constitutional scrutiny, "[t]here must be a

261. Another potential basis on which my proposed Section 2 test might be upheld is the
Elections Clause. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4. ( "The times, places and manner of holding elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such regulations ....
" ). The Elections Clause gives
Congress the broad power to regulate congressional elections, including not only their time and place,
but also registration, voter protection, fraud prevention, counting of votes, and the publication of
election returns. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). Lower courts have read the Elections
Clause broadly in upholding the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (commonly known as the
"NVRA" or "motor voter"). See ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 792 (7th Cir. 1995); Voting Rights
Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1995).
Of course, the Elections Clause could only furnish constitutional authority for Section 2's
application to federal elections. But at least with respect to vote denial, claims, that may well be
sufficient, as seems to have been the case with respect to the NVRA. After the enactment of the
NVRA, some states attempted to implement dual registration systems, with one NVRA-compliant list
for federal elections and another, noncompliant list for state elections. These dual systems proved to
be overly burdensome. See Jeffrey A. Bloomberg, Protectingthe Right Not to Vote from Voter Purge
Statutes, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1015, 1033 n.135 (1995) (noting that two states, Illinois and
Mississippi, chose to employ "expensive and cumbersome dual registration" systems after NVRA). By
the same token, states could conceivably adopt one ID rule for state elections and another for federal
elections-or even one form of voting equipment for federal elections and another for state
elections-in order to get around Section 2 if interpreted to cover these practices (and upheld only
under the Elections Clause). Because such dual systems are likely to prove too cumbersome to
administer effectively, the Elections Clause might be a functionally adequate constitutional basis for
Section 2 vote denial claims, despite its applicability only to federal elections.
262. See Hasen, supra note 225; Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional
Power to Enforce the Fourteenthand Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101
MICH. L. REv. 2341 (2003); Pitts, supra note 111, at 209-15.
263. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
264. See generally Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518-30 (2004) (discussing prior
applications of Boerne's congruence and proportionality test and holding Congress had the power to
enact legislation regarding the "inadequate provision of public services and access to public facilities"
under the Fourteenth Amendment); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,728, 740 (2004)
(describing Boerne's congruence and proportionality test and concluding Congress acted within its
power because "§ 2612(a)(1)(C) is congruent and proportional to its remedial object"); Bd. of Trs. of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 & n.9 (2001) (holding "Congress did not validly abrogate
the States' sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I" of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 because it failed the congruence and proportionality test);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000) (holding the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 unconstitutional because it was "'so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive
object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior'
(quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532)); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (2000) (holding
the statute, which provided a civil remedy for gender motivated violence, did not pass the congruence
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congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end. 265 While Congress has the power to proscribe
conduct that is not itself unconstitutional, in order to remedy or deter constitutional
violations, it lacks the power to engage in a "substantive redefinition" of rights as
defined by the Supreme Court.266 Congress exceeds its enforcement power when it
enacts a law so out of proportion to the objective of enforcing constitutional rights
that it can only be understood as an attempt to redefine those rights.2 67 Under this
standard, the Court has struck down portions of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, Violence Against Women Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.268
The Court has indicated, however, that Congress should have more latitude
when it seeks to remedy racial discrimination or protect fundamental rights like the
2 69
right to vote. Prior to Boerne, the Court upheld key portions of the VRA,
including the preclearance provisions of Section 5 that are generally thought to
impose more onerous burdens on state and local government entities than Section
2.270 The Supreme Court has also compared the VRA favorably to other statutes
that the Court has struck down.27' For example, in Board of Trustees of the
272
University of Alabama v. Garrett,
the Court noted that Congress had compiled

a much more extensive evidentiary record in support of the VRA than in support of
the statute at issue in that case, Title I of the ADA.273 With regard to the VRA, the
Court observed:
Congress documented a marked pattern of unconstitutional action
by the States. State officials, Congress found, routinely applied
voting tests in order to exclude African-American citizens from
registering to vote.... Congress' response was to promulgate in
the Voting Rights Act a detailed but limited remedial scheme
designed to guarantee meaningful enforcement of the Fifteenth
Amendment in those areas of the Nation where abundant evidence
of States' systematic denial of those rights was identified.274

and proportionality test); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 646 (1999) (holding the Patent Remedy Act did not satisfy the congruence and proportionality

test).
265. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
266. Lane, 541 U.S. at 520 (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20).
267. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
268. See supra note 264.
269. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173, 177 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 133-35 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646-47 (1966); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966).
270. See Pitts, supra note 85, at 237.
271. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-27 (2000).
272. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
273. Id. at 373.
274. Id.
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The Court's decisions in Hibbs and Lane also support the conclusion that my
proposed Section 2 test falls within the scope of congressional power.275 In Hibbs,
the Court upheld a portion of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 against a
constitutional attack.276 Even though little evidence of state discrimination
existed,277 the Court upheld the statute.278 The Court noted that Congress designed
the statute to address gender stereotyping, and that sex discrimination-unlike
discrimination based on disability-is subject to heightened equal protection
scrutiny. 279 Because the statute dealt with a suspect class, Congress's job of
establishing the requisite pattern of constitutional violations was easier. In Lane, the
Court upheld the application of Title II of the ADA to the accessibility of
courtrooms.2 80 The Court highlighted the fact that Congress had before it a record
which included discrimination against disabled persons with respect to
"fundamental rights," specifically mentioning voting. 28' This evidence, the Court
held, justified Congress's exercise of its "prophylactic power" to proscribe conduct
that is not itself unconstitutional.282
Taken together, Lane and Hibbs suggest that the Court will give Congress
greater latitude when Congress acts to enforce fundamental rights or to remedy
discrimination against a suspect class. Section 2 of the VRA falls into both of these
categories. In fact, Congress designed Section 2 to curb discrimination against the
prototypical suspect class with respect to the prototypical fundamental right.283
While the Supreme Court has not considered the constitutionality of Section 2 under
its new federalism jurisprudence, lower courts have uniformly upheld the statute
against constitutional challenge.28 4 These lower courts have determined that
Congress may enact legislation that sweeps in some voting practices that comply
with the Constitution as long as it is acting to protect the core value of preventing
intentional race discrimination from infecting the voting process. 258 A disparate-

275. Any optimism on this point should be tempered by the recent personnel changes on the
Supreme Court. Whether Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will follow the approach taken by the
majority of the Court in Hibbs and Lane remains to be seen.
276. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2004).
277. See Hasen, supra note 225, at 196-97.
278. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 740.
279. Id. at 735-36.
280. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004).
281. Id. at 524-25.
282. Id. at 528.
283. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (describing the right to vote as
"fundamental.. . because [it is] preservative of all rights").
284. See, e.g., United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 904-05, 907-09 (9th Cir. 2004)
(upholding the constitutionality of Section 2's results test and citing other lower court decisions doing
the same).
285. See id. at 908-09.
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impact analysis is a congruent and proportional remedy for intentional
discrimination in the voting process that might otherwise seep in undetected.286
Even aside from the arguments for Section 2's constitutionality that would
apply in any case,287 there are special reasons for upholding a broad remedy with
respect to vote denial claims. As other commentators have noted, the Court has
generally applied a more relaxed standard for intentional discrimination in voting
than in other contexts. 288 Even more importantly, the Court has dispensed with the
requirement of discriminatory intent entirely in some vote denial cases. In Harper
v. Virginia BoardofElections,289 for example, the Court struck down Virginia' s poll
tax because it impennissibly burdened the right to vote under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 290 Although the Court noted the possibility of a racially discriminatory

application of the poll tax, it did not actually rest its holding on a finding of
discriminatory intent, noting that such intent was unnecessary to hold the poll tax
unconstitutional.29 In Bush v. Gore,the Court held Florida's method of recounting

punch-card ballots in the 2000 election violated equal protection.292 The Court again
did not find that the method used denied racial minorities-or indeed any particular
group--equal treatment, much less than there had been intentionaldiscrimination
against any group. Instead, the Court identified the general principle of "equal
'
weight ... to each vote" and "equal dignity... to each voter,"293
while leaving the

details of this principle's application was a matter for another day (or other days).294
As the Court now famously (or infamously) put it: "Our consideration is limited to
the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes

286. Although decided before Boerne's articulation of the "congruence and proportionality"
standard, the Court's decision in Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), provides further support
for the conclusion that a Section 2 disparate-impact test falls within congressional enforcement power.
In Fitzpatrick, the Court unanimously upheld Title VII as a constitutional exercise of Congress'
authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Id. at 456.
287. See generally Pitts, supra note 111, at 189 (generally stating "three core values" in support
of finding Section 2 constitutional based on "any moderately conservative Court's" vision of
"Congress's enforcement power").
288. See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note 227, at 1137 (describing how the Court makes it more difficult
to prove intent in housing and employment discrimination than in cases involving voting, education,
and jury selection); Pitts, supra note 111, at 195 (citing Professor Ortiz and stating "the Court has
generally made it easier for racial minorities to prove purposeful racial discrimination in certain
contexts, including voting and education"); see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993)
("[R]edistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware
of race when it draws district lines.").
289. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
290. Id. at 670.
291. Id. at 666 n.3; see also RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW:
JUDGINGEQUALITY FROMBAKER V.CARRTOBuSHv. GoRE36-37 (2003) (discussing a proposed dissent
by Justice Goldberg for Harper, which was never published, finding "the principal aim of this
limitation [of the poll tax] was the disenfranchisement of Negroes").
292. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 8, 109-10 (2000).
293. Id. at 104.
294. Id. at 105.
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generally presents many complexities., 295 This leaves it less than clear what equal
protection standard should govern claims challenging inequalities in the
administration of elections. 96
The Supreme Court's failure to provide clear guidance on the scope of equal
protection rights in the area of vote denial furnishes a compelling argument for
upholding broad congressional enactments in this area. In the vote dilution area,
the Court has provided considerable clarity on the scope of the constitutional right.
Specifically, it has held that intentional race discrimination is required. 297 On the
other hand, the scope of equal protection rights is quite unclearwhen it comes to
vote denial. The Court has provided little guidance in regard to vote denial claims
beyond prohibiting poll taxes and disparate standards for conducting recounts
within a state.298 Whatever federalism interests ordinarily apply to the state's
conduct of its elections, Congress should be given the latitude to articulate and
enforce federal voting rights when the federal courts have not done so. This is
consistent with the deference that the Court has long accorded to Congress in its
decisions upholding the VRA and in its post-BoerneNew Federalism cases. Where
the Court has failed to articulate a clear constitutional rule, it would be more than
a little unreasonable to require Congress to toe the line by tailoring enforcement to
a constitutional right whose boundaries remain judicially undefined.299 For this

295. Id. at 109. For different interpretations of Bush v. Gore, compare Vikram David Amar,
Adventures in Direct Democracy: The Top Ten Constitutional Lessons from the California Recall
Experience, 92 CAL. L. REV. 927, 955-58 (2004) (describing the problems that have arisen with
subsequent attempts to interpret the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore and arguing the lack of the
explicitness in the decision's language have caused these problems), with Richard L. Hasen, The
CaliforniaRecall Punch-CardLitigation: Why Bush v. Gore Does Not "Suck" 17-19 (Loyola Law
School (Los Angeles) Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 2004-17, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=589001 (responding to Amar's criticisms of Bush v. Gore and arguing "the
opacity of the opinion is something to be praised, not condemned").
296. As Professor Pildes has observed, Bush v. Goreis probably best understood not as protecting
conventional individual rights, but rather as guarding against "self-interested partisan manipulation."
Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalizationof Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L. REV.
29, 50 (2004). Despite the Court's invocation of the "equal dignity owed to each voter," Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. at 104, the Court's main concern was that discretion conferred in local election officials in
Florida might be abused to the advantage of some groups of voters and the disadvantage of others. See
Daniel Tokaji, FirstAmendment EqualProtection:On Discretion,Inequality, and Participation,101
MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2515 (2003). To be sure, Bush v. Gore was not about harm to racially defined
groups. Nevertheless, the Court's overriding concern with inequalities flowing from excessive
administrative discretion has particular salience in cases where that discretion threatens racial minority
groups. Without a disparate-impact test or some other prophylactic rule, practices used to exclude
minority voters from participating in elections-like a modern-day poll tax-could all too easily escape
detection.
297. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
298. See Tokaji, supra note 296, at 2510-15 (providing one view on how courts might apply
Bush v. Gore's analysis to other issues of election administration).
299. Unlike other aspects of election administration, this analysis does not apply equally to felon
disenfranchisement because the Court has provided some clear guidance in this area. See e.g., Hunter
v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (holding a statute denying persons convicted of a crime of
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additional reason, the application of a disparate impact test to Section 2 vote denial
claims should be deemed to fall within Congress's authority to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.
V.

CONCLUSION

Section 2 vote denial cases occur at the nexus between two areas that have,
quite appropriately, received increased attention in recent years. The first area is
election administration, which includes not only the equipment used to vote but also
ID requirements, registration rules, provisional voting, and voter qualifications.
State and local practices in each of these areas are sure to remain the subject of
controversy, given the major parties' recognition-especially after Florida 2000 and
Washington 2004-that every vote does matter, at least in some elections. The
second area is the enforcement of the VRA, which recently celebrated its fortieth
birthday and is the subject of renewed attention given that key provisions are up for
renewal in 2007.
Section 2 is not among the expiring provisions, but its applicability to practices
that result in the disproportionate denial of minority votes will certainly command
the attention of courts for years to come. To date, the courts have failed to arrive
at a manageable test for vote denial claims under Section 2. In fact, some courts
have failed to appreciate that vote denial claims are qualitatively different from the
vote dilution claims that have mostly consumed the courts' attention in Section 2
cases since 1982. My recommended vote denial test would place the initial burden
on voters to demonstrate the challenged practice interacts with social and historical
conditions so as to result in the disproportionate denial of minority votes. The state
or local defendant would then have the burden of showing that the challenged
practice is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Such a test
has the advantage of ferreting out practices that may be rooted in discriminatory
intent that would otherwise be hard to prove, while at the same time allowing
practices that are genuinely necessary for the sound management of elections. My
test also falls squarely within the scope of Congress's prophylactic remedial powers
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
While one might quibble with the details of this proposed test, the most
important point is that the courts must create a workable test for evaluating Section
2 vote denial claims--one that can apply to felon disenfranchisement, voting
technology, ballot security measures, and other election administration practices.
If Section 2 is to prove an effective deterrent to the new vote denial, and if state and
local entities are to be given fair notice of what the statute proscribes, it is critical

moral turpitude of the right to vote unconstitutional and expressly stating the Court did not address
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment because racial discrimination motivated enactment of the
statute); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24,54 (1974) (distinguishing denying felons the right to vote
from other state practices that are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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that courts articulate the legal standard governing such claims more clearly than
they have until now.
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